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INTRODUCTION 
When David Gewirtz wrote that “not a single private-sector CIO 
[Chief Information Officer] would be allowed to get away with 
negligence on this massive scale,”1 he was referring to the failed 
electronic record-keeping procedures of an entity that is considered 
the highly secure base of operations for the formulation of domestic 
and international policy for the United States of America:  the White 
House.2  
The House of Representatives of the 110th Congress learned about 
the shortcomings of the e-mail archiving policies in the George W. 
                                                          
 1. David Gewirtz, The White House E-mail Controversy:  It’s Time for a Special 
Prosecutor, OUTLOOKPOWER MAG., May 2008, http://www.outlookpower.com/ 
issuesprint/issue200805/00002168.html. 
 2. See, e.g., Joseph Curl, Situation Room Updated, Upgraded, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 20, 
2006, at A4 (describing the White House situation room as the “most secure room in 
the most secure building in the world”). 
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Bush White House almost five years after the problems began.3  
Alarmed by the reported loss of hundreds of days’ worth of White 
House e-mails,4 the House passed the Electronic Message 
Preservation Act (“EMPA” or “H.R. 5811”) in July of 2008.5  This bill, 
which the Senate did not vote on,6 would have tasked the Archivist of 
the United States7 with issuing record-keeping standards and 
certifying White House compliance with those standards in an effort 
to ensure the efficient retention of publicly owned presidential 
records.8  The Bush White House, despite evidence indicating that its 
record-keeping systems were primitive,9 attested to the adequacy of its 
record-keeping procedures.  Further, the White House threatened to 
veto the bill, arguing that the bill’s provisions for expanded Archivist 
involvement in record-keeping policymaking would upset the 
constitutional balance of powers.10  
This Comment argues that tasking the Archivist of the United 
States with promulgating electronic record-keeping guidelines and 
certifying presidential compliance is constitutional because the 
President’s ability to perform his or her constitutional functions will 
not be impaired and, additionally, because Congress has 
constitutional authority to promote the important objective of 
                                                          
 3. See infra Part II.B (discussing how Congress indirectly learned of the White 
House’s inadequate archiving systems as a result of other, unrelated investigations in 
early 2006 and 2007). 
 4. See infra Part II.B (describing an official report which revealed that the White 
House lost nearly 500 days worth of e-mails due to problems with its electronic 
record-keeping system).      
 5. H.R. 5811, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 6. Id.   
 7. The Archivist of the United States is the federal officer in charge of the 
National Archives and Records Administration.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 70 (8th ed. 
2004).  Historian Dr. Allen Weinstein was the ninth Archivist of the United States, 
and served in that role between February 16, 2005, and December 19, 2008.  As of 
June 28, 2009, the Acting Archivist is Adrienne Thomas.  See Archivists of the United 
States:  1934–Present, http://www.archives.gov/about/history/archivists/ (last 
visited July 29, 2009).  The Archivist plays an important role in presidential record-
keeping, as he or she has special responsibilities with regard to decisions concerning 
both record disposal during the President’s term of office and also record disclosure 
after the President’s term of office.  See infra Part I.A (describing the role of the 
Archivist under the Presidential Records Act of 1978).  The Archivist is removable by 
the President and there is no for-cause requirement for removal.  See infra Part III.A.2 
(discussing how the possibility of summary removal inherently limits the Archivist’s 
license to institute record-keeping policies that the President may find 
objectionable). 
 8. See infra Part II.C (detailing the passage of the EMPA by the House of 
Representatives in July 2008). 
 9. See infra Part II.A (describing the Bush Administration’s record-keeping 
practices). 
 10. See infra Part II.D (discussing the White House criticism of the EMPA). 
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retaining presidential records.11  Part I examines the laws and 
jurisprudence that have culminated in public ownership of 
presidential records.  Part II discusses the Bush Administration’s 
record-keeping problems, the indirect way the United States 
Congress learned of the problems, and the subsequent legislative 
response—the EMPA.  Finally, Part III argues that the Bush 
Administration’s constitutional argument against the EMPA was 
specious.  
I. RECORD-KEEPING LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE 
A. The Legal Genesis of the Public Ownership of Presidential Records 
Prior to President Richard Nixon’s resignation in 1974, American 
Presidents did not have reason to question their personal control 
over the management and disposal of White House records.12  
President George Washington began a long tradition of private 
ownership of presidential records when he bequeathed his papers to 
his nephew, Associate Supreme Court Justice Bushrod Washington.13  
While a number of presidents enabled at least some access to their 
papers by donating them to public libraries,14 others personally 
ensured that the information would be inaccessible to future 
generations of Americans.15  Heirs to the records sometimes 
exhibited a lack of knowledge about, or concern for, the records’ 
                                                          
 11. See infra Part III (arguing that the EMPA does not upset the constitutional 
balance of powers). 
 12. See generally BRUCE P. MONTGOMERY, SUBVERTING OPEN GOVERNMENT:  WHITE 
HOUSE MATERIALS AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH POLITICS 10–12 (2006) (describing how 
President Nixon argued that a tradition of private ownership of presidential papers 
justified the agreement with Arthur F. Sampson that gave him joint control of the 
materials); Jonathan Turley, Presidential Papers and Popular Government:   
The Convergence of Constitutional and Property Theory in Claims of Ownership and Control of 
Presidential Records, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 651, 657–65 (2003) (proposing that the 
ownership of presidential records by former chief executives was a product of a long-
held assumption rather than an articulated governmental policy); Jennifer R. 
Williams, Note, Beyond Nixon:  The Application of the Takings Clause to the Papers of 
Constitutional Officeholders, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 871, 876–82 (1993) (exploring the 
common law and historical traditions of personal ownership of papers of the 
officeholders in all three branches of the American government). 
 13. See Turley, supra note 12, at 657 (adding that President Washington’s nephew 
“dispersed Washington’s papers among a wide variety of private parties”). 
 14. See id. at 661 (listing Presidents Hoover, Theodore Roosevelt, Taft, Franklin 
Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Ford, and Carter as those who 
bequeathed presidential materials to public libraries, but also noting that some of 
them gave the materials under conditions of restricted access and use).   
 15. See id. at 660 (noting that Presidents Van Buren, Pierce, Grant, Garfield, 
Arthur, and Coolidge ordered their records to be destroyed); see also MONTGOMERY, 
supra note 12, at 11 (“The papers of William Henry Harrison, John Tyler, Zachory 
Taylor, and Andrew Johnson were destroyed or partially lost in fires while in their 
private possession.”). 
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historical value: President Abraham Lincoln’s son disposed of at least 
some of his father’s Civil War correspondence,16 and President 
Warren Harding’s widow destroyed most of her husband’s records.17 
After President Nixon left office, he entered into an agreement 
with the Administrator of General Services, Arthur Sampson,18 that 
embodied the tradition of giving former Presidents control over the 
records of their presidency.19  The Nixon-Sampson Agreement20 
recognized the former President’s rights to the records of his tenure, 
including his right to destroy White House tape recordings after a 
three-year period during which the tapes could be used in court 
proceedings.21  
The Nixon-Sampson Agreement elicited a negative response by 
persons who questioned the customary practice of giving former 
Presidents complete control over their records.22  Advocates for 
historians asked Congress to craft legislation that would make official 
documents and presidential materials public property.23  These voices 
were not ignored—only three months after the signing of the Nixon-
Sampson Agreement, Congress nullified the compact by passing the 
                                                          
 16. Turley, supra note 12, at 660 & n.45. 
 17. Id. at 660 n.46.  
 18. At the time of the Nixon-Sampson Agreement, the National Archives was 
under the authority of the Administrator of the General Service Administration 
(“GSA”).  See ROBERT M. WARNER, DIARY OF A DREAM:  A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL 
ARCHIVES INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT, 1980–1985, at 4 (1995).  Robert M. Warner, who 
would later lead a more independent National Archives, described this as an ill-
fitting arrangement, since the GSA—which, among other practical responsibilities, 
oversaw the maintenance of public buildings—was neither “interested in [n]or 
equipped to contribute to the cultural leadership of the nation.”  Id. at 4–5.  
President Nixon, perhaps recognizing this, “refused to work with the Archivist but 
instead made a deal with the Administrator of the GSA to leave final control of these 
records (including destruction)” to himself.  Id. at 6. 
 19. Indeed, Sampson signed the agreement only after Attorney General William 
B. Saxbe wrote a legal opinion affirming the tradition of Presidents’ personal 
ownership of presidential records.  See 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 1106 (1974); see also 
Williams, supra note 12, at 890 (chronologizing the events related to the Nixon-
Sampson Agreement).   
 20. The text of the Nixon-Sampson Agreement is available in the appendix to a 
district court decision from 1975.  See Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107, 160–63 
(D.D.C. 1975) (holding, in part, that the agreement was invalidated by the 
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act).   
 21. Id.  
 22. See MONTGOMERY, supra note 12, at 5–6 (detailing the criticism of the Nixon-
Sampson Agreement from various actors, including newspaper columnists, law 
professors, and lawmakers such as Senator Charles Percy, who asserted, “these 
documents, tapes, and other materials are rightly the property of the American 
people”). 
 23. Id. at 11 (recounting that the National Historical Publications and Records 
Commission, the Organization of American Historians, and individual actors like 
M.P. Schnapper took the position that the Nixon-Sampson Agreement prevented 
society from attaining a complete understanding of the Nixon presidency). 
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Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (“PRMPA”).24  
The PRMPA kept all historically significant materials pertaining to 
the Nixon Administration in the custody of the Administrator of 
General Services and, importantly, banned destruction of the 
Watergate materials pending their use in the courts.25   
The PRMPA tasked the Administrator of General Services with 
devising regulations for the screening of the papers by executive 
branch archivists, and provided the terms for future distribution of 
the records.26  The PRMPA also established the National Study 
Commission on Records and Documents of Federal Officials 
(“Commission”) and directed it to consider the control, disposition, 
and preservation of government documents.27  In 1977, the 
Commission recommended that all presidential papers be treated as 
public property and suggested that the President be able to control 
access to the records for up to fifteen years after leaving office.28   
The PRMPA dealt only with President Nixon’s records,29 and the 
Commission’s recommendations had no binding authority.30  
However, with passage of the Presidential Records Act of 1978 
(“PRA”), Congress authoritatively declared that the United States 
would reserve and retain complete ownership, possession, and 
control of presidential records,31 beginning with presidential 
documentary materials created or received after January 20, 1981.32  
The legislation defined a presidential record as: 
                                                          
 24. Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695 (1974) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C.  
§ 2111 (2006)).   
 25. See Note, Government Control of Richard Nixon’s Presidential Material, 87 YALE L.J. 
1601, 1604 (1978) (noting that the presidential materials were to be retained in 
order to preserve material for use upon a showing of “particularized need” and also 
to preserve material of interest to the  public for public access).  
 26. Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695 (1974) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C.  
§ 2111 (2006)).  
 27. Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1699 (1974) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C.  
§§ 3316–17 (2006)). 
 28. Turley, supra note 12, at 665 & n.80. 
 29. See Pub. L. No. 93-256, § 101(b)(1), 88 Stat. 1695, 1695 (1974) (codified at  
44 U.S.C. § 2111 (2006)) (“[T]he Administrator shall receive, retain, or make 
reasonable efforts to obtain, complete possession and control of all . . . objects and 
materials which constitute the Presidential historical materials of Richard M. Nixon, 
covering the period beginning January 20, 1969, and ending August 9, 1974.”). 
 30. See Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1699 (1974) (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3317 
(2006)) (“It shall be the duty of the Commission to study problems and questions 
with respect to the control, disposition, and preservation of records and documents 
produced by or on behalf of Federal officials, with a view toward the development of 
appropriate legislative recommendations and other recommendations regarding 
appropriate rules and procedures with respect to such control, disposition, and 
preservation.”). 
 31. 44 U.S.C. § 2202 (2006).   
 32. Pub. L. No. 95-591, 92 Stat. 2524 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 2201 
(2000)). 
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[A document] created or received by the President, his immediate 
staff, or a unit or individual of the Executive Office of the President 
whose function is to advise and assist the President, in the course of 
conducting activities which relate to or have an effect upon the 
carrying out of the constitutional, statutory, or other official or 
ceremonial duties of the President.33  
Records of a purely private or non-public character, however, are 
not reserved or retained by the United States.34 
The PRA does not authorize immediate disclosure of presidential 
records to the public.35  Information becomes available to the public 
five years after the end of a given administration, and former 
Presidents may demand that the release of certain documents be 
delayed for an additional seven years after the five-year period has 
elapsed.36  Moreover, some documents are allowed to be withheld 
indefinitely, such as national security information that has been 
properly classified pursuant to an executive order.37  In January 2009, 
President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13,489, which 
governs the process by which presidential records are approved for 
release to the public.38  
                                                          
 33. 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2) (2000). 
 34. Id. § 2201(3).  While the PRA does not enable judicial review of presidential 
record-keeping practices, courts have allowed review of the guidelines that delineate 
between presidential and non-presidential records.  See infra Part I.C (describing 
jurisprudence that addressed the possibility of judicial review of presidential record-
keeping management under the PRA).   
 35. Id. § 2204.  See generally Turley, supra note 12, at 667–70 (discussing the PRA’s 
provisions concerning the release of records after the President leaves office). 
 36. See 44 U.S.C. § 2204(a)(1)–(7) (listing the records that may be delayed for 
twelve years, including:  materials that may be kept secret for national security 
reasons; materials concerning the appointment of federal officials; materials that are 
exempted from disclosure by statute; materials that constitute confidential trade 
secrets and commercial or financial information; materials that constitute 
confidential communications between the President and advisors concerning 
requests for advice; and materials such as private personnel and medical files). 
 37. See id. § 2204(c)(1) (incorporating all but one of the Freedom of Information 
Act’s (“FOIA”) exemptions as provisions that allow for indefinite withholding of 
presidential materials).  Presidential materials that fall within the incorporated FOIA 
exemptions include:  national security information that has been classified pursuant 
to an executive order; information that is related solely to the internal personnel 
rules and practices of an agency; information that Congress has statutorily exempted 
from release; trade secrets and other information that would reveal privileged or 
confidential commercial or financial information; information that would constitute 
an invasion of privacy if released; some categories of law enforcement records; 
information used by agencies responsible for the regulation or supervision of 
financial institutions; and information or maps concerning wells.  See 5 U.S.C.  
§ 552(b)(1)–(4), (6)–(9) (2000).  The FOIA exemption that is not available for 
purposes of withholding a Presidential record covers materials that constitute “inter-
agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law 
to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.”  Id. § 552(b)(5). 
 38. Exec. Order No. 13,489, 74 Fed. Reg. 4669 (Jan. 26, 2009).  Executive Order 
13,489 explicitly revoked President Bush’s Executive Order 13,233.  Compare Exec. 
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The PRA also addressed the area of presidential record-keeping 
management, stating that the President is responsible for 
documenting his or her official acts and maintaining those 
documents as “presidential records.”39  However, the President does 
not have the authority to destroy records clandestinely.  Whenever 
the President wishes to dispose of presidential records that no longer 
have administrative, historical, informational, or evidentiary value, 
the President must notify the Archivist about the pending action and 
obtain the Archivist’s written opinion on the matter.40   
If the Archivist does not object to the disposal, the President must 
submit copies of the disposal schedule to Congress and wait sixty 
calendar days of continuous session before destroying the 
documents.41  On the other hand, if the Archivist believes that 
particular records might be of special interest to Congress or that 
consultation with Congress regarding the disposal of the records is in 
the public interest, then the Archivist must request the advice of four 
congressional committees:  the Senate Committee on Rules and 
Administration, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, the 
House Committee on House Oversight, and the House Committee 
on Government Operations.42  Otherwise, the PRA gives the President 
total discretion regarding his own record-keeping management 
practices and, importantly, does not endow Congress or the Archivist 
with the power to veto presidential record-keeping decisions.43  
                                                          
Order No. 13,489, 74 Fed. Reg. 4669 (Jan. 26, 2009) (giving an incumbent President, 
but not former Presidents, authority to prohibit the Archivist from releasing 
presidential records), with Exec. Order No. 13,233, 3 C.F.R. § 815 (2002), reprinted 
in 44 U.S.C. § 2204 (2006) (giving the incumbent President, former Presidents, 
former Vice Presidents, and their designees broad authority to deny access to 
presidential documents or to delay their release indefinitely).  Also in January 2009, 
the House of Representatives passed H.R. 35, a bill that that would establish a process 
by which incumbent and former presidents can review presidential records in order 
to determine whether to assert executive privilege.  This bill, if passed by the Senate 
and signed by the President, would establish that the Archivist must comply with the 
wishes of the incumbent President with regard to claims of executive privilege.   
S. REP. NO. 111-21, at 1 (2009).  However, if the current President declines to support 
a former President’s privilege claim, the Archivist would delay releasing the records 
for a short time to give the former President time to obtain a court order to enforce 
his privilege claim.  Id. at 4.   
 39. See 44 U.S.C § 2203(a) (2000) (directing the President to “take all such steps 
as may be necessary to assure that the activities, deliberations, decisions, and policies 
that reflect the performance of his constitutional, statutory, or other official or 
ceremonial duties are adequately documented and that such records are maintained 
as Presidential records . . . .”). 
 40. See id. § 2203(c)–(e). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.  
 43. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 286–90 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding 
that that, although the Federal Records Act authorizes the Archivist to assist agencies 
in the development of records management systems, the PRA does not have an 
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B. The Supreme Court’s Assessment of Presidential Records Laws 
The shift to public ownership of presidential records did not go 
unchallenged.  President Nixon attacked the constitutionality of the 
PRMPA, the predecessor to the PRA; he contended that Congress did 
not have the requisite power to delegate to a subordinate officer of 
the executive branch the decision whether to disclose presidential 
materials and to prescribe the terms that govern any disclosure.44  
Additionally, Nixon argued that the PRMPA’s authorization of future 
publication of presidential records, except where a privilege was 
established, offended the presumptive confidentiality of presidential 
communications.45  When the District Court of the District of 
Columbia dismissed Nixon’s action,46 the former President filed a 
petition for a writ of certiorari.   
The resulting 1977 Supreme Court decision in Nixon v. 
Administrator of General Services (“Nixon II”) directly addressed the issue 
of control over presidential records and materials.47  The Court ruled, 
in a 7-2 decision, that granting custody of the presidential materials 
to the Administrator of General Services and permitting their 
archival screening did not render the PRMPA unconstitutional on its 
face.48  The decision noted that Nixon’s argument that the Act 
violated the separation of powers rested on “archaic” notions of 
“airtight departments of government.”49   
The Nixon II Court also ruled that the PRMPA did not 
impermissibly burden White House decision-making and therefore 
                                                          
analogous provision and, thus, the Archivist lacks authority to inspect the President’s 
records or survey the President’s records management practices); see also Turley, 
supra note 12, at 669 (observing that the PRA leaves record-keeping practices entirely 
to the President’s discretion and does not expressly provide for judicial review of 
record-keeping decisions).   
 44. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 439–41 (1977).  
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 430. 
 47. Id.  See generally Sandra E. Richetti, Comment, Congressional Power vis a vis the 
President and Presidential Papers, 32 DUQ. L. REV. 773, 782–787 (1993–94) 
(summarizing the decision in Nixon II and suggesting that the Court’s analysis could 
have the effect of rendering constitutional any future regulation enacted by Congress 
to control access to presidential materials). 
 48. See Nixon II, 433 U.S. at 425–29 (rejecting Nixon’s arguments that the PRMPA 
was an unconstitutional infringement on executive branch powers).  Justice Brennan 
delivered the opinion of the Court,  Justice Stevens issued a concurring decision, and 
Justices White, Blackmun, and Powell each wrote separately, all concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment; Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist wrote 
separate dissents.  Id.    
 49. Id. at 443 (quoting the district court, Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 408  
F. Supp. 321, 342 (D.D.C. 1976)).  
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was not so at odds with executive privilege as to be unconstitutional.50  
The Court emphasized the fact that the executive branch remained 
in full control of presidential materials.51  According to the Court, it 
was reasonable to assume that Presidents expect professional 
archivists, who operate within the executive branch and had 
previously examined records in presidential libraries, to examine 
their records on a confidential basis.52  Due to this expectation, and 
because archivists had an “unblemished” record of handling 
confidential materials, the Court held that the PRMPA did not 
interfere with the ability of White House officials to have candid 
conversations with the President.53   
The Nixon II Court did not limit its analysis to the possible 
interference with presidential communications.  Instead, it held that 
an overriding need to promote objectives within Congress’s 
constitutional authority would permit some interference with 
executive privilege.54  Since future Presidents have an interest in 
accessing the records of past White House decisions, and the 
American people have an interest in being able to reconstruct 
history, limited interference with presidential confidentiality was 
justifiable to protect the integrity of records.55  Further, Congress had 
already legislated extensively in the area of regulation and mandatory 
disclosure of executive branch documents,56 so the legislation’s 
objective of keeping historical Nixon-era documents in the possession 
of the United States was within the constitutional authority of 
Congress.57 
                                                          
 50. Id. at 446–55.  A prior case involving President Nixon, United States v. Nixon 
(“Nixon I”), established the rule that Presidents and former Presidents may assert a 
privilege with respect to communications made in performance of official 
responsibilities and in the process of shaping the nation’s policies.  418 U.S. 683, 708 
(1974).  However, the existence of sufficient fundamental interests must prevail over 
assertions of generalized interest in presidential privacy—and, in Nixon I, the 
compelling public interest of uncovering possible criminal activities by an elected 
leader prevailed over President Nixon’s interest in executive confidentiality.   
Id. at 711–13.  
 51. See Nixon II, 433 U.S. at 444 (“It is clearly less intrusive to place custody and 
screening of the materials within the Executive Branch itself than to have Congress 
or some outside agency perform the screening function.”). 
 52. Id. at 452. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id.  
 55. See id. at 453 (“Congress can legitimately act to rectify the hit-or-miss 
approach that has characterized past attempts to protect these substantial interests by 
entrusting the materials to expert handling by trusted and disinterested 
professionals.”). 
 56. See id. at 445 (pointing to the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act, 
the Government in the Sunshine Act, and the Federal Records Act as examples of 
prior legislation regulating executive branch records).   
 57. Id.  
 2009] WHITE HOUSE RECORD-KEEPING POLICYMAKING 1577 
C. Judicial Review of Presidential Record-Keeping  
Unavailable Under the PRA 
The PRA does not give Congress or the Archivist veto power over 
the President’s record-keeping management decisions.58  The statute, 
however, does not expressly address whether presidential record-
keeping could be subject to judicial review.59  On review of a district 
court’s refusal to dismiss a case challenging President George H.W. 
Bush’s record-keeping practices,60 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit held in Armstrong v. Bush that the 
PRA impliedly precludes judicial review of presidential record-
keeping practices.61 
The controversy underlying the case arose in 1989 during the 
transition from the Reagan Administration to the Bush 
Administration.62  A group of researchers and historians filed suit to 
enjoin the disposal of information contained on a White House  
e-mail system known as the Professional Office System (“PROFS”).63  
The district court did not find that the PRA envisions judicial review 
of presidential record-keeping practices; instead, it found that the 
PRA contemplates administrative action and congressional oversight 
as the statute’s primary enforcement mechanisms.64  However, the 
court decided that the President’s performance of his statutory duty 
to adequately document and maintain presidential records is 
                                                          
 58. See supra Part I.A (describing the PRA’s provisions for presidential record-
keeping management, including the President’s broad discretion with regard to his 
own record-keeping practices). 
 59. 44 U.S.C. § 2202 (2000); see also Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 289–91 
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting that the PRA contains no provision that expressly precludes 
judicial review).   
 60. See Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Supp. 343, 353 (D.D.C. 1989) (concluding that 
judicial review of the President’s compliance with the PRA is permissible under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because the obligation to retain presidential 
records is nondiscretionary). 
 61. See Armstrong, 924 F.2d at 297 (reversing the district court’s decision that the 
APA authorizes judicial review of the President’s compliance with the PRA).   
 62. The Reagan administration had utilized an e-mail system known as the 
Professional Office System, which allowed the deletion of communications sent over 
PROFS without first printing the communications.  See Armstrong, 721 F. Supp. at 
345–47.  Most entities within the Executive Office of the President (“EOP”) created 
daily back-up tapes of communications that had not been deleted from PROFS.  Id.  
They kept these tapes for six weeks at the most before recycling the tapes, and 
thereby losing the records contained on them.  Id.  The National Security Council, 
also an EOP component, followed the same process, but created back-up tapes 
weekly and recycled the tapes after only two weeks.  Id.  On January 19, 1989, Reagan 
Administration officials started the presidential transition and began preparing to 
dispose of the contents of the PROFS.  Id.  
 63. See id. at 347 (asking the court additionally to direct the President and the 
National Security Council to properly classify the records under either the PRA or 
the Federal Records Act, and to order the Archivist to carry out his statutory duties). 
 64. Id. at 349. 
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reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).65  While 
decisions that involve the exercise of discretionary political authority 
are beyond APA review,66 the court asserted that the implementation 
of records management controls is ministerial rather than 
discretionary.67  Therefore, since the “obligation to actually retain 
presidential records is clear and nondiscretionary” under the PRA, 
judicial review of the President’s compliance with the PRA was 
permissible under the APA.68 
On review by the circuit court, the plaintiffs argued that the 
President should be considered an agency since the APA did not 
include the President in its list of non-agency entities.69  However, the 
three-judge panel disagreed, citing the legislative history of the APA 
and the fact that the President does not have to follow APA 
rulemaking procedures when issuing executive orders as support for 
the conclusion that the President is not an agency and is, therefore, 
not subject to judicial review under the APA.70  The appellate court 
also held that, regardless of the President’s agency status, Congress 
did not intend to allow “outsiders”71 to interfere with White House 
record-keeping practices.72  The court reached this conclusion after 
noting that even the Archivist did not have authority to survey the 
President’s records management practices.73  Thus, in overruling the 
lower court, the circuit court held that judicial review of the 
President’s record-keeping policies was precluded by the PRA.74  
                                                          
 65. Id. at 349–53. 
 66. Id. at 352. 
 67. See id. at 352–53 (stating that, because the PRA sets forth clear standards by 
which to determine whether certain documents qualify as presidential records, the 
President bears a nondiscretionary duty to apply those standards). 
 68. See id. at 353 (holding that the President’s unilateral decision to discard the 
PROFS system was an exercise of discretion that does not comport with the PRA’s 
disposal provisions, which set out a specific process involving the Archivist and 
Congress).  
 69. Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 70. Id. at 289. 
 71. Id. at 290. 
 72. See id. at 288 (agreeing with the appellants’ argument that even if the APA 
applies to the President, the PRA precludes judicial review). 
 73. Id. at 290. 
 74. Id. at 291.  Two years later, however, the circuit court clarified that courts 
may actually review the guidelines that define what records fall within the category of 
“presidential records,” because the PRA does not give “the President the power to 
assert sweeping authority over whatever materials he chooses to designate as 
presidential records without any possibility of judicial review.”  See Armstrong v. 
Executive Office of the President, Office of Admin., 1 F.3d 1274, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 
1993) (holding, in part, that the mere existence of paper printouts of electronic 
materials did not constitute record status unless paper versions included all of the 
significant material contained in electronic records). 
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II. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S 
INEFFECTIVE ELECTRONIC RECORD-KEEPING PRACTICES 
A. The Bush Administration’s Electronic Record-Keeping Practices 
From 1994 until 2002, the White House utilized the Automated 
Records Management System (“ARMS”), an archiving infrastructure 
that accompanied its Lotus Notes e-mail system.75  ARMS was custom 
designed for the White House because, at that time, no commercial 
“off-the-shelf” e-mail records management system existed.76  This 
system captured e-mail messages at the time of transmission and 
receipt and maintained these messages in an electronic format.77  
ARMS enabled users to designate the status of an e-mail as either a 
record or a non-record; by default, all incoming external e-mail was 
marked as a record, and any messages sent by White House users who 
did not make a designation were marked as records.78  Despite these 
features, ARMS was plagued by glitches,79 and the Clinton White 
House was criticized for shielding problems from public scrutiny.80 
In 2002, senior Bush Administration staff members decided that 
the White House would switch from the Lotus Notes e-mail system to 
                                                          
 75. See Letter from Steven McDevitt to Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman of 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Pt. 1, at 4–5, (Feb. 21, 2008), 
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20080226143915.pdf [hereinafter Letter] 
(answering questions posed by Rep. Waxman about the preservation of presidential 
and federal records, writing as the former Director of Architecture and Engineering 
for the White House Office of the Chief Information Officer).  
 76. Laton McCartney, Behind the Missing White House E-Mail, 
http://www.ciozone.com/index2.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1307&po
p=1&page=4&Itemid=9 (last visited July 29, 2009). 
 77. See Jason R. Baron, E-mail Metadata in a Post-Armstrong World (1999), 
http://www.archives.gov/era/pdf/baron-email-metadata.pdf (noting that the 
Clinton Administration’s Executive Office of the President instituted ARMS in order 
to reduce “long-term management burdens” by “the embedding of record status 
metadata”). 
 78. See id. (describing the mechanics of e-mail recording, or non-recording, 
under ARMS). 
 79. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELECTRONIC RECORDS:  CLINTON 
ADMINISTRATION’S MANAGEMENT OF EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT’S E-MAIL 
SYSTEM 2, 16 (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01446.pdf (finding 
that the Executive Office of the President was afflicted by two separate archiving 
problems—the “Mail2” and “Letter D” malfunctions—and concluding that 
“[c]omputer malfunctions, ineffective systems and records management practices, 
and miscommunication between EOP components led to e-mail records not being 
preserved by ARMS”). 
 80. See McCartney, supra note 76 (mentioning that Northrop Grumman 
employees working to fix the Clinton Administration’s archival system were ordered 
by the White House Director of Management and Administration to maintain 
“absolute silence” regarding their work, and that the Chairman of the House 
Government Reform Committee chided the White House for attempting to conceal 
the ARMS glitches). 
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Microsoft Exchange.81  The decision to switch from Lotus Notes to 
Microsoft Exchange required White House technical staff to modify 
ARMS so that this archival system would operate under the new 
system; however, both attempts to modify ARMS failed.82  
The White House transitioned from Lotus Notes to Microsoft 
Exchange without instituting a records management solution.83  
Instead, the White House initially archived messages by manually 
copying messages from Microsoft Exchange and converting them to 
Personal Storage Table files (“.pst files”).84 Later, the process of 
creating .pst files was “partially automated” using the program Mail 
Attender.85   
By the admission of a former White House information technology 
professional, reliance on .pst files as an archiving tool is a primitive 
data management solution that does not correspond with 
government standards.86  In 1997, the Department of Defense issued 
the Design Criteria Standard for Electronic Records Management 
Software Applications (“DoD Standard 5015.2-STD”), a set of baseline 
functional requirements that can be applied to all government 
records management programs.87  The DoD Standard 5015.2-STD 
requires that records management programs capture and 
automatically store transmission and receipt data, and specifically 
                                                          
 81. See Letter, supra note 75, pt. 1, at 4 (explaining that the staffers desired to use 
Microsoft’s Outlook and Exchange programs because they had been used during the 
2000 Republican campaigns, they were widely used in the business community, they 
integrated with the Microsoft Office programs used within the Executive Office of 
the President, and because Outlook offered features that were not available in the 
Lotus Notes system). 
 82. See id. at 6 (saying that the first attempt involved an effort to modify the 
Windows XP and Microsoft Outlook interfaces to support integration with ARMS, 
but failed due to “numerous technical issues”; and the second effort—using Legato 
E-mailXtender to “provide a mechanism for all Outlook/Exchange e-mails to be 
managed in ARMS”—did not effectively manage the volume of White House e-mail 
and was abandoned). 
 83. See id. at 7 (saying that despite the decision to proceed with the migration, 
“there was a great deal of concern about proceeding with the migration to 
Outlook/Exchange without having an adequate e-mail records management solution 
in place”). 
 84. Microsoft Outlook uses .pst files to store data.  See Microsoft Help and 
Support, How to Manage .pst files in Outlook 2007, in Outlook 2003, and in Outlook 
2002, http://support.microsoft.com/kb/287070 (last visited July 29, 2009).   
When .pst files become too large, or become corrupted, data loss is a common result.  
OutlookBackup.com, PST Files, http://www.outlookbackup.com/pst-file.html  
(last visited July 29, 2009).  
 85. Letter, supra note 75, pt. 1, at 6. 
 86. See id. at 7 (“The process by which e-mail was being collected and retained 
was primitive and the risk that data would be lost was high.”). 
 87. See generally Jason R. Baron, The PROFS Decade, in THIRTY YEARS OF ELECTRONIC 
RECORDS 105, 122 (Bruce I. Ambacher ed., 2003) (discussing the genesis of DoD 
Standard 5015.2-STD). 
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points out that the management systems should not allow editing of 
the messages’ metadata.88 
The White House’s method of manually copying .pst files, by 
contrast, did not involve a mechanism that could reconcile the 
messages that were retained in the .pst files and those that were 
processed by the Microsoft Exchange server.89  The implication of this 
deficiency is that there is no way to verify either that the archival 
system contains all of the data that is passed through the server, or 
that the records themselves are preserved in an unaltered state.90  
Additionally, the system did not track user modification of data files.91  
Thus, there is neither a way to verify if inappropriate modifications 
took place, nor a way to determine who may have performed those 
inappropriate activities.92  Unsurprisingly, it was later confirmed that 
the days with fewer than normal archived White House e-mails 
corresponded with the period when the manual archiving of .pst files 
occurred.93 
The White House technology staff was aware of these potential 
problems when the e-mail system migration took place.94  Therefore, 
the Office of Architecture and Engineering and other White House 
components developed a new electronic archiving system, the 
Electronic Communications Records Management System 
(“ECRMS”).95  Planning for the ECRMS started in November 2002 
and—after years of completing requirements analyses, as well as 
system configuration, testing, and tuning—the system was ready to 
“go live” on August 21, 2006.96  On that date, however, White House 
Chief Information Officer Theresa Payton decided not to implement 
                                                          
 88. Baron, supra note 77, at 6. 
 89. See Letter, supra note 75, pt. 1, at 7 (elaborating that four risks existed due to 
migrating without an adequate records management system:  incomplete data, lack 
of data reconciliation, negative public perception, and inability to ensure user 
accountability). 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. (“The approach of simply storing e-mail message [sic] in .pst files provides 
no mechanism or audit trail that tracks changes to data files or the activities 
performed by users or system administrators.”). 
 92. Id. 
 93. See The National Security Archive, White House E-mail Chronology, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20080417/chron.htm (last visited July 29, 
2009) [hereinafter National Security Archive] (noting that Deputy General Counsel 
of Office Administration Keith Roberts informed House Committee on Oversight 
staffers of the correlation). 
 94. See Letter, supra note 75, pt. 1, at 7 (“There was a great deal of concern about 
proceeding with the migration to Outlook/Exchange without having an adequate e-
mail records management solution in place.”). 
 95. Letter, supra note 75, pt. 2, at 9. 
 96. See id. at 11 (affirming the system’s ability to handle the volume of Executive 
Office of the President’s e-mails).  
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the ECRMS.97  The reasons for this decision are unclear.98  Parties 
interested in the preservation of presidential records criticized 
Payton’s decision,99 and the White House was left without a formal 
electronic record-keeping system.100 
National Archives and Records Administration101 (“NARA”) officials 
did not play a persuasive role in the implementation of the Bush 
Administration’s electronic record-keeping practices. While NARA 
initially approved the ECRMS project in 2002,102 the agency’s later 
involvement was largely limited to warning staffers from the Executive 
Office of the President in early 2004 that the White House  
“was operating at risk by not capturing and storing messages outside 
the e-mail system.”103  At least one White House information 
technology professional was told to not discuss e-mail retention issues 
or the analysis performed regarding missing e-mails with NARA 
                                                          
 97. See National Security Archive, supra note 93.  
 98. On October 31, 2007, Payton explained that ECRMS was aborted because it 
would have required eighteen months to ingest the backlog of messages from the 
journal e-mail folders in the Microsoft Exchange system and also because she 
claimed that the new system would not have been able to distinguish between federal 
and presidential records on the one hand, and personal records on the other.   
See McCartney, supra note 76.  The Office of Administration, it should be noted, had 
reviewed the latter issue and had ruled that it was not a concern.  Id.  On February 
26, 2008, however, Payton cited the need for additional modifications, performance 
issues, and projected costs as the bases for her cancellation of the ECRMS.  Id.  
 99. See National Security Archive, supra note 93 (questioning Payton’s reasoning 
that the ECRMS should not be implemented as it would take eighteen months to 
ingest backlogged messages, because the ingestion period would have concluded 
before the termination of the Presidency). 
 100. See National Archives and Records Administration, Chronology of White 
House Meetings 5, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20080417/NARA%20 
Chronology%20of%20White%20House%20Meetings.pdf (noting that, as a result of 
the absence of a formal record-keeping system, the National Archives and Records 
Administration will eventually receive the e-mails in “multiple formats”). 
 101. NARA is the successor to the National Archives and Records Service, which 
had previously operated within the General Services Administration.  See infra note 
161 and accompanying text (highlighting the historical trend of gradually increasing 
independence of the archiving function from the Executive through legislation).  
NARA’s self-described mission is to: 
[Serve] American democracy by safeguarding and preserving the records of 
our Government, ensuring that the people can discover, use, and learn from 
this documentary heritage.  We ensure continuing access to the essential 
documentation of the rights of American citizens and the actions of their 
government. We support democracy, promote civic education, and facilitate 
historical understanding of our national experience.  
The National Archives and Records Administration, Vision and Mission, 
http://archives.gov/about/info/mission.html (last visited July 29, 2009).  
 102. See McCartney, supra note 76 (listing the Office of Administration Counsel, 
the White House Office of Records Management, the White House Counsel, and the 
NARA as entities that reviewed and approved the ECRMS plan). 
 103. The National Security Archive, Summary of Jan 6, 2004, Meeting with EOP re 
ECRMS at Archives II 2, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20080417/Summary 
%20of%20Jan%206,%202004%20meeting%20with%20EOP.pdf. 
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staff104 and, when NARA was finally granted access on October 31, 
2007, to a 2005 Office of Administration report on missing White 
House e-mails,105 they were only allowed to review, and not copy, it.106 
B. Congress Learns About the White House’s Inadequate Electronic  
Record-Keeping Practices Through Investigations into Unrelated Controversies 
Congressional legislation relating to the White House’s electronic 
record-keeping practices was crafted only after investigations into 
other controversies revealed the deleterious effects of the White 
House’s inadequate archiving systems.  During the trial of I. Lewis 
“Scooter” Libby, Special Counsel Patrick Fitzgerald responded to the 
defense’s allegations that the prosecution was withholding evidence 
by disclosing that the White House had been unable to find and 
produce e-mails of the Office of Vice President and Executive Office 
of the President for a set of days in early October 2003.107  While this 
admission was not heavily publicized,108 a subsequent, unrelated 
congressional investigation into the firings of eight U.S. Attorneys in 
2007 brought electronic record-keeping issues squarely into the 
public consciousness.  
In order to determine whether the U.S. Attorneys were fired for 
political reasons, Democratic lawmakers asked the White House for 
thousands of pages of relevant White House documents.109  On April 
12, 2007, White House officials indicated that an indeterminate 
number of e-mails—including correspondence sought in connection 
with the firings—were lost because they were sent by White House 
                                                          
 104. See Letter, supra note 75, pt. 2, at 8 (relating that the Chief Information 
Officer had said that the White House Counsel and White House Records 
Management would answer all inquiries about records management, and that White 
House information technology staffers were “not allowed to discuss the potential  
e-mail retention issues” with NARA staff). 
 105. See infra note 113 and accompanying text (noting the many days of 
unrecorded e-mails from both the Office of the President and the Office of the  
Vice President). 
 106. See National Security Archive, supra note 93 (showing that NARA first made a 
request for the Office of Administration Report on April 25, 2007, but was finally 
allowed to review it on October 31, 2007). 
 107. See White House E-Mails Might Have Been Lost, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,  
Feb. 2, 2006, at A2 (reporting that Special Counsel Fitzgerald wrote a letter to the 
defense team saying that while he was not aware of any destroyed evidence, “we have 
learned that not all e-mail . . . . was preserved through the normal archiving process 
on the White House computer system”).  
 108. See Michael Kranish, Subpoenas Vowed Over ‘Lost’ E-Mails, BOSTON GLOBE,  
Apr. 13, 2007, at A1, available at  2007 WLNR 7060143 (“The fact that e-mails are 
missing was noted—but not widely and publicly noticed—in the perjury trial of  
Vice President Dick Cheney’s former chief of staff, I. Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby.”). 
 109. See id. (explaining that Senator Patrick J. Leahy, a Democrat from Vermon, 
and Representative Henry A. Waxman led the initial inquiry into the missing  
e-mails).  
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employees who were using nongovernmental accounts.110  Five days 
later, however, White House spokeswoman Dana Perino intimated 
that there were deeper problems with the Administration’s electronic 
record-keeping infrastructure, saying that “there could have been 
some e-mails that were not automatically archived because of a 
technical issue.”111 
Indeed, an Office of Administration report—created in 2005 but 
not released to Congress or NARA until September 19 and October 
31 of 2007, respectively112—reveals that problems with the White 
House’s electronic record-keeping system may have resulted in 473 
days in which the e-mails for one or more White House components 
were not archived, plus an additional 229 days with fewer e-mails than 
would reasonably be expected.113  Additionally, the status of the back-
up tapes on which these missing e-mails may have actually been 
preserved is contested:  the White House says that the missing, non-
archived e-mails “should” be on the tapes, while other parties point 
out that, by the White House’s own admission, at least 83 days worth 
of relevant back-up tapes no longer exist.114  The House Oversight 
Committee has procured documents that indicate that neither the 
White House’s e-mail archiving system, nor its back-up tapes, retain 
any of the Office of the Vice President’s e-mails for the period 
between September 30, 2003, and October 6, 2003—which is 
precisely the time when the Justice Department began its 
investigation into the Plame affair.115  There are also serious concerns 
                                                          
 110. See id. (noting that the White House declared the e-mails missing only after 
the Senate Judiciary Committee sought more information about the firings). 
 111. Press Release, Dana Perino, Press Secretary, The White House, Press Briefing 
(April 16, 2007), http://www.georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/ 
2007/04/20070416-1.html.  
 112. National Security Archive, supra note 93. 
 113. See COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, EOP EXCHANGE 
ENVIRONMENT—ALL COMPONENTS (2006), available at http://oversight.house.gov/ 
documents/20080227155329.pdf.  Specifically, no White House Office e-mail was 
archived for December 17, 20, 21 of 2003; January 9, 11, 29, of 2004; and February 1, 
2, 3, 7, 8 of 2004.  No Office of the Vice President e-mail was archived for September 
12, 2003; October 1, 2, 3, 5 of 2003; January 29, 30, 31 of 2004; February 7, 8, 15, 16, 
17 of 2005; and May 21, 22, 23 of 2005.  See Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman to 
Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the President (Jan. 17, 2008), http:// 
oversight.house.gov/documents/20080117181419.pdf; see also Pete Yost, White House 
Missing as Many as 225 Days of E-mail, CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY & ETHICS IN WASH., 
Aug. 20, 2008, http://www.citizensforethics.org/node/33804 (indicating that the 
White House is seeking to recover lost e-mails dating back to August 2003, but not 
the missing e-mails that were created between March 2003 and July 2003). 
 114.  See Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Mandamus Relief at 21, Nat’l 
Sec. Archive v. Executive Office of the President, No. 07-1577, 2009 WL  102146  
(D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2007) (arguing that the Court should not accept the Executive 
Office of the President’s unsupported claims of e-mail preservation).  
 115. See McCartney, supra note 76.  
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about the current retention system’s inability to segregate federal and 
presidential records, as well as its susceptibility to manual 
tampering.116   
These e-mails were lost because of the White House’s failure to 
implement adequate electronic record-keeping systems.117  Moreover, 
these inadequacies, combined with the circuitous and indirect way 
Congress learned about them, served as the impetus for new 
legislation that would give the Archivist of the United States the 
ability to certify whether the systems are adequate, rather than relying 
on the chance that other investigations may reveal such problems.118  
C. The House of Representatives Passes the EMPA 
On July 9, 2008, the EMPA119 was passed in the House of 
Representatives.120  The bill’s sponsors designed the legislation to 
modernize the requirements of both the PRA and the Federal 
Records Act so that deficiencies in the electronic record-keeping 
practices of the White House and federal agencies, respectively, could 
be recognized and corrected.121  The Senate did not vote on the bill, 
and so the EMPA died when the 110th Congress came to a close in 
early 2009.122   
                                                          
 116. See generally Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Mandamus Relief at 
12–15, National Security Archive v. Executive Office of the President, Executive 
Office of the President, Office of Administration, No. 07-1577, 2009 WL 102146  
(D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2007) (asserting that the White House’s retention system is 
deficient, seeking the restoration of deleted records, and compelling the Archivist to 
set forth guidelines for an adequate system to preserve federal records).  
 117. See generally DAVID GEWIRTZ, WHERE HAVE ALL THE E-MAILS GONE? 115–143 
(2007) (finding that the White House e-mail archiving plan was “transparently 
unworkable”). 
 118. See infra Part II.C (delineating the role and responsibilities of the Archivist 
under the EMPA).  
 119. H.R. 5811, 110th Cong. (2008).  The bill was originally introduced as the 
Electronic Communications Preservation Act; the title of the bill was later changed to 
the Electronic Message Preservation Act in order to clarify that the legislation 
applied to electronic messages rather than electronic communications.  The bill 
defined electronic messages as “electronic mail and other electronic messaging 
systems that are used for purposes of communicating between individuals.”   
H.R. REP. NO. 110-709, at 2 (2008).  
 120. See Richard Simon, House Votes to Preserve E-mails, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 2008, at 
13, available at 2008 WLNR 12902408 (explaining that the bill passed by a vote of  
286 to 137, and that Republican Representative Thomas M. Davis III of Virginia 
criticized the Democratic leadership for focusing on this bill at a time when a 
housing crisis and high gasoline prices were affecting the nation).  
 121. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-709, at 3–4 (2008) (summarizing the purpose of the bill 
and noting that it was introduced by Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Rep. William Lacy Clay, 
and Rep. Paul Hodes).  
 122. Rep. Paul Hodes introduced a similar bill in March 2009.  H.R. 1387,  
111th Cong. (2009).  As of July 5, 2009, the House of Representatives has not voted 
on the bill.   
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In regard to presidential electronic record-keeping management, 
the EMPA would have amended the PRA by directing the Archivist123 
to establish standards for the capture, management, and preservation 
of White House e-mails and other electronic messages.124  
Additionally, the Archivist would have been tasked with establishing 
standards for a system in which electronic messages would be readily 
accessible for retrieval through electronic searches.125  These 
standards would have needed to be formulated to ensure 
“economical and efficient management” of electronic records during 
the President’s term of office.126 
While the Archivist would have been responsible for promulgating 
record-keeping standards pursuant to the EMPA, the President would 
have continued to establish and implement the actual electronic 
records management policies.127  The Archivist would, however, have 
certified whether the record-keeping systems established by the 
President met the Archivist’s standards for the economical and 
efficient capture, management, and preservation of searchable White 
House e-mails and other electronic messages.128  Pursuant to the 
EMPA, certification would have taken place annually, with the 
Archivist reporting on the status of the certification to both the 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
and the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.129  
Under the EMPA, the Archivist would have also reported to 
Congress one year after the President’s last term in office regarding, 
first, the “volume and format of presidential records deposited into 
                                                          
 123. See supra note 7 (describing the position of the Archivist of the United 
States). 
 124. H.R. 5811, 110th Cong. § 3(a) (2008). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See id. § 3(b) (“The Archivist shall annually certify whether the records 
management controls established by the President meet requirements under sections 
2203(a) and 2206(5) of this title.” (emphasis added)). 
 128. Id.  Generally speaking, a certification requirement is a statutory provision 
that requires the President or another official to certify to Congress that a particular 
state of affairs does or does not exist.  See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional 
Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 107 (2006) (explaining that certification 
requirements are often utilized “in programs involving contingent discretion, that is, 
discretion that may be exercised only upon the existence or nonexistence of the 
specified state of affairs”).  Certification provisions have appeared in statutes since 
the infancy of the nation in the late eighteenth-century; they are especially numerous 
in foreign policy legislation.  See Mark A. Chinen, Presidential Certifications in  
U.S. Foreign Policy Legislation, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 217, 221 n.16 (1999) (stating 
that in 1798, for example, the President was required to certify that members and 
officers of the Senate have received or will receive payments for their services). 
 129. H.R. 5811, 110th Cong. § 3(b)(1) (2008). 
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that President’s Presidential archival depository,”130 and second, 
whether the President’s records management controls comported 
with the record-keeping standards promulgated by the Archivist.131  
Importantly, all of the EMPA’s amendments to the PRA would have 
taken effect one year after the legislation’s enactment.132 
D. The White House Criticizes the EMPA 
Despite a record of White House electronic record-keeping 
mismanagement, the Bush Administration indicated that it  
“has always been committed to preserving electronic records,” and 
that it does not believe that the EMPA is needed to address the 
record-keeping management issues.133  Accordingly, upon the House 
of Representative’s passage of the EMPA on July 9, 2008, the 
Executive Office of the President indicated that the President would 
veto the legislation if it ever reached the Oval Office.134  
The White House described its opposition to the EMPA in the 
language traditionally used in discussions about the constitutional 
separation of powers.135  In a Statement of Administration Policy, the 
White House first addressed the amendments to the PRA,136 even 
though Federal Records Act (FRA) amendments were addressed first 
in the EMPA.137  The White House threatened to veto the bill for the 
following reasons: 
 The bill would amend the Presidential Records Act (PRA) in 
fundamental ways that would upset the delicate separation of 
powers balance that Congress established in 1978 and require the 
Archivist to intrude, in an excessive and inappropriate manner, 
into the activities of an incumbent President and his or her staff.  
The bill would substantially alter the framework that Congress 
crafted in the PRA by subjecting the President and White House 
offices to requirements resembling those that the Federal Records 
Act (FRA) applies to executive branch agencies.  The bill would 
require the Archivist to promulgate regulations that would 
establish “standards necessary for the economical and efficient 
management of Presidential records during the President’s term of 
                                                          
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Simon, supra note 120.  
 134. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, 
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY:  H.R. 5811—THE ELECTRONIC MESSAGE 
PRESERVATION ACT (July 8, 2008), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ 
legislative/sap/110-2/saphr5811-r.pdf [hereinafter STATEMENT]. 
 135. See infra Part III. 
 136. STATEMENT, supra note 134.  
 137. H.R. 5811, 110th Cong. §§ 2–3 (2008).  
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office.”  The bill does not define “economical and efficient 
management,” and, therefore, would appear to provide the 
Archivist with substantial leeway to establish standards that could 
impose significant costs and burdens on an incumbent 
Administration, which could interfere with a President’s ability to 
carry out his or her constitutional and statutory responsibilities.  
Moreover, the bill would require the Archivist to “annually certify 
whether the records management controls established by the 
President meet requirements” of specific provisions in the PRA, as 
well as to submit annual reports to Congress on the status of the 
annual certifications.  Such authority is unprecedented and would 
mark a significant departure from accepted and longstanding 
practice.138   
The Bush Administration concluded its Statement by expressing 
dissatisfaction with the EMPA’s provisions to amend the FRA, saying 
it would impose burdens on administrative agencies and curtail those 
agencies’ ability to implement appropriate record-keeping 
technologies.139  Yet, in describing its opposition to the FRA 
amendments, it did not cite the potential for upset to the “delicate 
separation of powers” as it did in relation to the PRA amendments.140   
Considering the Bush Administration’s reaction, the question 
becomes whether the EMPA’s amendments to the PRA impermissibly 
upset the balance of powers as delineated by the Constitution and the 
Supreme Court of the United States.  Despite the Senate’s failure to 
vote on the bill, the disagreement between the House and the Bush 
Administration remains important for at least two reasons.   
First, since the advent of e-mail, each Administration has experienced 
e-mail retention issues.141  It is reasonable to presume that such issues 
                                                          
 138. STATEMENT, supra note 134. 
 139. See id. (arguing, first, that “the bill’s provision requiring ‘the electronic 
capture, management, and preservation’ of ‘electronic messages that are records’ is 
onerous and overly broad and, in some cases, will prove counterproductive”; second, 
that “the bill’s requirement that electronic messages be ‘readily accessible for 
retrieval through electronic searches’ is vague”; third, that “the bill could impose 
enormous unfunded costs on agencies”; fourth, that “the bill would place restrictions 
on the technological approach that could be adopted”; and, finally, that  
“[t]he statement that the regulations shall include such requirements [regarding 
capture, management, and preservation of electronic records] ‘[t]o the extent 
practicable’ does not provide sufficient clarity regarding the breadth of these 
requirements and the burdens that would be imposed on agencies”). 
 140. See supra notes 134–139 and accompanying text (describing Bush 
administration arguments against amending the PRA to give the Archivist 
“unprecedented” authority over executive branch activities).  
 141. See, e.g., R. Jeffrey Smith, Bush E-Mails May Be Secret a Bit Longer:  Legal Battles, 
Technical Difficulties Delay Required Transfer to Archives, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2008,  
at A1 (noting that the Reagan Administration tried to order the erasure of electronic 
backup tapes during Reagan’s final days in office, that George H.W. Bush “struck a 
secret deal with the U.S. archivist shortly before midnight on his final day in office to 
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will continue and that the legislature will look to improve oversight 
over the record-keeping in the future.  Second, the Bush 
Administration’s argument that this type of bill upsets the balance of 
powers is bolstered by a 1984 White House memorandum written by 
now-Supreme Court Chief Justice John G. Roberts that cautioned that 
the Archivist’s independence from the President could raise 
constitutional concerns.142  Anticipating future debates about the role 
of the Archivist, this comment argues that legislation in the mold of 
the EMPA is constitutionally permissible.  
III. THE EMPA WOULD NOT HAVE UPSET  
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE OF POWERS 
A. The EMPA Would Not Have Placed Custody or Screening of  
White House Materials Outside of the Executive Branch 
The EMPA would have required the Archivist of the United States 
to promulgate standards necessary for the economical and efficient 
management of presidential records during the President’s term of 
office, to annually certify whether the records management control 
established by the President meets statutory requirements, and to 
submit annual reports to Congress on the status of this certification.143  
The White House indicated that it would have vetoed the bill, 
ostensibly because giving the Archivist these responsibilities would 
undermine the balance of powers contemplated in the PRA.144  
                                                          
seal White House e-mails,” and defects in the White House e-mail archiving system 
resulted in political controversy and the expenditure of $12 million to recover the 
missing e-mails from back-up tapes). 
 142.  John G. Roberts wrote the memorandum, but it was signed by his superior, 
Fred F. Fielding.  Memorandum from Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the President, to 
Richard G. Darman, Assistant to the President (May 16, 1984) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Memorandum from Fred F. Fielding].  It must be noted, however, that 
Roberts was commenting on a draft version of the bill that created the NARA.   
The memorandum found the proposed legislation troubling because the Archivist 
would have been appointed for a ten-year term, without regard to political 
affiliations, and solely on the basis of the professional qualifications.  It also 
expressed ambivalence about whether the President could actually remove the 
Archivist at will.  However, the bill that was signed into law removed the term 
requirement.  The law also explicitly gave the President power to remove the 
Archivist.  The language concerning professional qualifications remained 
unchanged.  44 U.S.C. § 2103 (2000).  Roberts also made the separate point that, 
from a policy standpoint, the legislation would make it difficult for the President to 
control the Archivist because the bill increased the “stature of the Archivist” and 
contributed to an “aura of professional detachment.”  Memorandum from Fred F. 
Fielding, supra. 
 143. See supra Part II.C (detailing the Archivist’s proposed duties under the 
EMPA). 
 144. See supra Part II.D (summarizing the Bush Administration’s objections to the 
EMPA). 
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The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Nixon II145 provides the 
analytical basis for discussions about the constitutionality of record-
keeping statutes.146  In that 1977 decision, the Court established that 
the proper inquiry is whether such legislation prevents the executive 
branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned duties.147  
The Court determined that the legislation in question in Nixon II, the 
PRMPA, was not  unduly disruptive to the executive branch because 
neither an agency outside of the executive branch nor Congress had 
the power to perform the function of screening the records of former 
President Nixon.148  Additionally, the Act was designed to ensure that 
White House records could only be released when the release was not 
barred by a claim of executive privilege.149 
A decade later, the Court added a measure of specificity to the 
Nixon II test for evaluating the scope and constitutionality of 
Congressional intrusion into executive branch responsibilities.   
In Morrison v. Olson,150 the Court held that Congress’s creation of an 
independent counsel to investigate allegations of wrongdoing against 
executive branch officials did not erode executive power to an 
impermissible extent because the President possessed sufficient 
control over the independent counsel.151  This conclusion resulted 
                                                          
 145. 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
 146. See Richetti, supra note 47, at 782–87 (characterizing Nixon II as a case 
involving Congressional regulation of presidential papers and noting that the 
principles underlying this decision differed from previous separation of powers cases 
which had accorded the President more deference on the issue of executive 
privilege). 
 147. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).  The President, also 
known as “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of 
the Militia of the several States,” has administrative powers, clemency powers,  
treaty-making powers, appointing powers, the power to fill vacancies, the power to 
send messages to Congress and the power to call special sessions and adjourn 
Congress, the power to receive foreign representatives, and the more general power 
to faithfully execute the laws.  See U.S. CONST. art. II.  Commentators have noted that 
the executive power is not defined in the Constitution, and thus the President can 
“draw upon a vast reservoir of authority to sustain actions that defy exact 
enumeration in the Constitution.”  See, e.g., EDWARD F. COOKE, A DETAILED ANALYSIS 
OF THE CONSTITUTION 62 (7th ed. 2002); cf. C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 45 (5th ed. 1997) (offering the proposition that the 
President’s executive powers are limited more by “the confines of political feasibility” 
than by the Constitution).   
 148. 433 U.S. at 444–45. 
 149. Id. at 444.  
 150. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 151. Id. at 694–96.  Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, which was 
joined by six other justices.  Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion.  Justice Kennedy 
took no part in the case and did not give a reason for his decision to recuse himself.  
See Stuart Taylor, Justice Kennedy Shuns Special Prosecutor Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 
1988, at A7 (hinting that Justice Kennedy may have wanted to recuse himself from a 
decision that could have affected Attorney General Edwin Meese—a major player in 
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from an analysis of the independent counsel’s nature and place in 
the governmental framework.152  First, the Court noted, Congress 
retained no powers of control or supervision over the independent 
counsel.153  Second, Congress’s role under the Act was limited to 
receiving reports or other information and oversight of the 
independent counsel’s activities. 154  Third, while the Act reduced the 
amount of control that the Attorney General and, by extension, the 
President exercised over the investigation and prosecution of a 
certain class of alleged criminal activity,155 the independent counsel 
could nevertheless be removed for “good cause” by the Executive.156  
Considering the precedent set by these two cases, the EMPA passes 
constitutional muster because the President would retain a sufficient 
amount of authority over the electronic record-keeping process. 
1. The White House would have continued to make record-keeping policy 
decisions under the EMPA 
Similar to the PRMPA at issue in Nixon II, the EMPA would have 
placed all custody and screening of presidential materials within the 
executive branch.  Therefore, the EMPA comported with the 
holdings in Nixon II and Morrison by not interfering with the 
President’s ability to perform his or her constitutional duties.157   
This conclusion is supported by the fact that, under the EMPA, the 
President and his or her staff would have continued to operate the 
White House electronic record-keeping system.158  The EMPA merely 
tasked the Archivist with promulgating standards for electronic 
record-keeping systems that aim at ensuring that presidential 
                                                          
the nomination of Justice Kennedy by President Reagan—who was under 
investigation by a special prosecutor himself). 
 152. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660–65 (analyzing the provisions of Title VI of the 
Ethics in Government Act, which provided for an independent counsel who would 
have the power “to investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute certain high-ranking 
Government officials for violations of federal criminal laws”). 
 153. Id.; see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732 (1987) (holding that agents 
who are removable by Congress may not be entrusted with executive powers).  
 154. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696. 
 155. Id. at 695–96 (“The Attorney General is not allowed to appoint the individual 
of his choice; he does not determine the counsel’s jurisdiction; and his power to 
remove a counsel is limited.”). 
 156. Id. at 696 (noting that the Attorney General’s power to remove for cause 
“provides the Executive with substantial ability to ensure that the laws are ‘faithfully 
executed’ by an independent counsel”). 
 157. See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443–44 (1977) (holding that, 
since the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the executive 
branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions, it is relevant that 
the PRMPA provided for “custody of the materials in officials of the Executive 
Branch and that employees of that branch have access to the materials only ‘for 
lawful Government use, subject to the [Administrator’s] regulations’”). 
 158. Electronic Message Preservation Act of 2008, H.R. 5811, 110th Cong. § 3(a). 
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electronic communications will be properly captured, managed, and 
preserved, and certifying the level of presidential compliance with 
those standards.159  Therefore, since the President and his staff would 
remain responsible for crafting the actual White House record-
keeping controls and processes, the EMPA would have been 
constitutionally permissible.160   
2. The Archivist of the United States is effectively an executive branch official 
Even if it is argued that granting the Archivist the authority to issue 
standards and certify presidential implementation is an impermissible 
transfer of control away from the White House, the EMPA would have 
passed constitutional muster under Nixon II because the Archivist is 
effectively an executive branch official.  The Archivist is the head of 
the NARA,161 an administrative entity that is popularly referred to as 
an independent agency.162  However, NARA does not possess the 
traditional characteristics of an independent agency; instead, the 
structure of NARA resembles that of a more traditional executive 
branch agency.  
Congress designed independent administrative agencies to be 
shielded from the unimpeded political will of the executive branch.163  
                                                          
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See National Archives and Records Administration Act of 1984, 44 U.S.C.  
§§ 2101–2119 (2000) (establishing NARA as “an independent establishment in the 
executive branch of the Government to be known as the National Archives and 
Records Administration.  The Administration shall be administered under the 
supervision and direction of the Archivist.”).  But see Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. 
Edles, Established by Practice:  The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies,  
52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1236–94 (2000) (describing independent federal agencies, 
but not including NARA, on a list which is meant to be inclusive). 
 162. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 785 (8th ed. 2004) (defining an independent 
agency as “[a] federal agency, commission, or board that is not under the direction 
of the executive, such as the Federal Trade Commission or the National Labor 
Relations Board”).  While independent agencies may not be under the direct and 
obvious control of the executive, it has been widely noted that even the most 
independent of independent agencies are located within the executive branch.   
See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 65 (1986) 
(concluding that since the Constitution specifies that there are three branches of 
government, independent agencies may not be considered as constituting a “fourth 
branch”; rather, they must be considered as part of the executive branch); Alan B. 
Morrison, How Independent are Independent Regulatory Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 252, 
252–56 (1988) (arguing that the answer to the question “how independent are 
independent agencies” is “not very” because, in part, the leaders of independent 
agencies are redesignated on an annual basis by the President and most independent 
agencies do not have independent litigation authority separate from the Department 
of Justice).  Therefore, even if NARA is a truly independent agency, it is still an 
executive branch agency and, thus, legislation like the EMPA is not constitutionally 
impermissible. 
 163. See KEITH WERHAN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.2 (2008) (“As the 
names suggest, executive agencies are designed to be responsive to the political and 
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Independent agencies often have sensitive and vital responsibilities, 
and so Congress intended independent agencies to interact with the 
three traditional branches of government with a degree of 
“‘separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity,’ so 
that ‘practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable 
government.’”164  On the other hand, non-independent agencies are 
designed by Congress to administer statutory programs; the President 
fulfills the Constitutional obligation to see that the laws are 
“‘faithfully executed’ by overseeing the manner in which 
administrative agencies carry out their statutory authority.”165   
Structurally, independent agencies possess certain characteristics 
that serve to insulate agency decision-making from undue political 
influence.166  Despite its popular reputation, however, NARA does not 
possess these characteristics and, therefore, is not a traditional 
independent agency. 
The most salient characteristic of agency independence is the 
protection provided to agency leaders against summary removal by 
the President.167  Statutory language such as “[removable only for] 
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” means that the 
President may not remove agency officials “without either reason or 
explanation.”168  Additionally, if the agency exercises adjudicatory 
responsibilities, then courts may imply a “for cause” limitation on the 
President’s ability to remove officers from the agency even if the 
statute is silent regarding removal restrictions.169  Conversely, the 
President does not need to proffer any reason in order to remove 
agency officials at non-independent agencies.170 
                                                          
policy direction of the president, while independent agencies are somewhat 
insulated from presidential control.”); see also Breger & Edles, supra note 161, at 1117 
(noting that structural and organizational elements, along with agency traditions and 
practices, contribute to independent agencies’ ability to “conduct their business 
fairly and effectively while keeping them somewhat above the political fray”). 
 164. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 598 F.2d 759, 
775 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
 165. WERHAN, supra note 163, § 2.4. 
 166. See Breger & Edles, supra note 161, at 1135–55.  
 167. See id. at 1138 (noting that protection against summary removal has been, 
and continues to be, the “critical criterion” by which legal academics distinguish 
between independent and executive branch agencies); Paul Verkuil, Separation of 
Powers, The Rule of Law, and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 330 
(1988–89) (“The condition that makes the independent agency truly independent is 
a statutory restriction on removal for cause.”). 
 168. Breger & Edles, supra note 161, at 1135, 1145. 
 169. Id. at 1146. 
 170. See WERHAN, supra note 163, § 2.4 (explaining that those executive 
department heads that occupy a seat in the President’s cabinet are especially prone 
to removal without cause). 
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The leader of NARA, the Archivist of the United States,171 may be 
removed from his office without cause,172 thereby inherently limiting 
the Archivist’s license to institute electronic record-keeping policies 
that the President may find objectionable or overly burdensome.  
The President must report to Congress “the reasons for any such 
removal,”173 but the absence of language that the President may only 
remove the Archivist for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance 
in office indicates that summary removal is allowable.  It is apparent 
that Congress intended to omit this for-cause removal provision:  an 
early version of the Senate bill that established NARA included for-
cause removal language, but this provision was eventually removed.174  
Additionally, courts are not likely to imply a for-cause limitation on 
the President’s removal power because the Archivist has no 
adjudicatory duties.175 
The leadership structure of independent agencies is designed to 
insulate agency decision-making from political influences.  
Independent agencies are normally led by multi-member entities, 
such as five- or seven-member boards. Typically, a leader—such as a 
Chairman—will serve as chief executive and administrative officer.176  
Importantly, no more than a bare majority of agency leaders may be 
from the same political party.177  On the other hand, a single 
individual, who serves at the pleasure of the president, typically heads 
executive agencies.178   
                                                          
 171. See supra note 7.  The Archivist prescribes such regulations as he or she deems 
necessary to effectuate the functions of the Archivist.  44 U.S.C. § 2104(a) (2000).   
 172. Id. § 2103(a).  
 173. Id. § 2103(a). 
 174. See Stephen H. Yuhan, The Imperial Presidency Strikes Back:  Executive Order 
13,233, the National Archives, and the Capture of Presidential History, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1570, 1578 n.44 (2004) (“The version of the Act initially passed by the Senate 
provided for the Archivist to serve a fixed term of ten years, removable only for good 
cause, see S. Rep. No. 98-373, at 23 . . . . but this section was changed by the 
Conference Committee to its present form, in which the term of the Archivist is not 
specified, and in which there is no ‘good cause’ requirement for removal, see H.R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 98-1124, at 19–20 . . . .”).   
 175. Breger & Edles, supra note 161, at 1146 (referencing a case in which a court 
read a limitation on the President’s removal power because the agency had an 
intrinsic adjudicatory character).   
 176. See id. at 1165.  For example, it is common for a Chairman to manage the use 
and expenditure of funds as well as the appointment and supervision of employees.  
Id.  The Board of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, for example, will defer 
to the Chairman on administrative matters; but, still, the Chairman will work 
cooperatively with them on those issues.  Id. at 1245–46. 
 177. See id. at 1137–41 (noting that there are a few exceptions to the  
“bare majority” rule, as the statutes governing the National Labor Relations Board, 
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, and the Federal Mine 
Safety and Health Review Commission do not require political balance). 
 178. WERHAN, supra note 163, § 2.4.   
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The leadership structure of NARA does not resemble that of the 
traditional independent agency because most responsibility and 
decision-making is vested solely in the Archivist—who is appointed by 
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and is not 
protected by removal restrictions179—rather than a multi-member 
entity.180  According to the statute that established NARA, the 
Archivist plans, develops, and administers all programs and functions 
of NARA.181  While the Archivist must be chosen on the basis of 
professional credentials rather than political affiliation, there is no 
mechanism in place to balance the Archivist’s views with those of 
other appointees.182  Indeed, the Deputy Archivist is not coequal with 
the Archivist and performs the duties that the Archivist assigns him.183  
The Inspector General is appointed by the Archivist and reports to 
and is under the general supervision of the Archivist.184   
The Archivist, thus, is effectively an executive branch official who 
serves at the pleasure of the President.  Not only does the White 
House retain control over the implementation of electronic record-
keeping policies under the EMPA,185 but the Archivist, who is tasked 
with issuing electronic record-keeping standards and certifying 
compliance to Congress, is appointed, and can be removed, by the 
President.  Therefore, the Bush Administration’s contention that the 
EMPA would have impermissibly infringed on the President’s ability 
to perform his or her constitutional duties to execute the laws is, at 
the least, an overstatement.   
B. The EMPA Would Not Have Imposed an Impermissible “Chilling Effect” 
on White House Communications 
The EMPA directed the Archivist to promulgate standards for 
record-keeping during the President’s term of office.186  By contrast, 
the PRMPA pertained to the management of records after President 
                                                          
 179. 44 U.S.C § 2103(a) (2000). 
 180. Breger & Edles, supra note 161, at 1137-38. 
 181. 44 U.S.C. § 2104. 
 182. 44 U.S.C. § 2103. 
 183. 44 U.S.C. § 2103(c). 
 184. Inspector General Act, 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 8(d) (1978).  The NARA Office of 
Inspector General performs “audits and investigations of NARA, its contractors, and 
its grantees, to promote economy and efficiency and to prevent and detect fraud, 
waste, and abuse.”  Office of the Inspector General, National Archives and Records 
Administration, http://www.archives.gov/oig/index.html (last visited July 29, 2009). 
 185. See supra Part III.A.1 (stating that “the EMPA merely tasked the Archivist with 
promulgating standards for electronic record-keeping systems” and that  
“the President and his staff would remain responsible for crafting the actual White 
House record-keeping controls and processes”). 
 186. Electronic Message Preservation Act of 2008, H.R. 5811, 110th Cong. § 3(a). 
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Nixon had left the White House.187  Despite this difference, the EMPA 
would not have imposed burdens on the Executive that would have 
limited the ability of the President and his advisers to communicate 
frankly and with the expectation of confidentiality.   
In Nixon II, the Supreme Court held that the PRMPA would not 
impermissibly interfere with presidential communications.188   
The Court assumed that allowing archivists to screen presidential 
materials after a President’s term constituted only a “very limited” 
intrusion;189 moreover, it was an intrusion that Presidents and their 
staffs must have anticipated considering that executive branch 
personnel had previously screened records in presidential libraries, 
and had compiled an “unblemished” record while handling these 
confidential materials.190 
While the EMPA’s provisions related to electronic record-keeping 
management during the President’s tenure, the legislation would not 
have impeded the President’s ability to communicate effectively.   
The EMPA would not have altered the ability of the President to 
exercise his or privilege to withhold certain records from public 
disclosure after the term of office.191  Instead, the EMPA was crafted 
to preserve the mere existence of these records.192  Thus, a fear of 
disrupted executive branch communications under legislation like 
the EMPA should be considered specious for two reasons: first, the 
EMPA would likely have decreased third-party interference with 
White House communications and, second, the EMPA did not 
mandate that the Archivist and his staff examine actual records, as 
certification would involve only a survey of record-keeping practices.   
First, the implementation of the Archivist’s electronic record 
management standards should not lead to increased disclosure of 
records during the President’s term of office.  Rather, contemporary 
electronic record-keeping systems are more likely to secure 
communications from third-party interference.193  The DoD Standard 
5015.2 mandates that record-keeping systems store transmission and 
                                                          
 187. See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 433–36 (1977) (discussing 
the provisions of the PRMPA). 
 188. Id. at 455. 
 189. Id. at 451. 
 190. Id. at 452. 
 191. See supra notes 35–43 and accompanying text (discussing categories of 
information falling into a former President’s executive privilege).  
 192. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-709, at 3 (2008) (“H.R. 5811 modernizes the 
requirements of the Federal Records Act and the Presidential Records Act to ensure 
the preservation of e-mails and other electronic messages.”).  
 193. See supra notes 86–93 and accompanying text (analyzing risks of not 
implementing adequate record-keeping systems).  
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receipt data and also prevent editing of the document’s metadata.194  
On the other hand, the Bush Administration negligently failed to 
protect the security of its file servers and file directories prior to the 
middle of 2005.195  Therefore, about two thousand staff members 
within the Executive Office of the President could have chosen to 
clandestinely access and possibly alter the White House’s .pst files, 
which were being used to store the Administration’s e-mails.196   
This possibility existed during a period, after September 11, 2001, 
when the government was conducting anti-terror operations and 
military action worldwide.197  Had the White House implemented an 
electronic record-keeping system that complied with common 
standards, the President could have given his advisers a more 
meaningful assurance of confidentiality.198  It is reasonable to assume 
that more intimate collaboration between the Archivist and White 
House information technology professionals will lead to a more 
secure electronic communications system,199 and so the EMPA would 
have operated to legitimatize the President’s expectation of 
confidentiality.  
Secondly, the certification requirement of the EMPA would not 
have necessarily involved the examination of actual presidential 
records.200  The Archivist, who is removable by the President,201 would 
have been tasked with annually certifying that the electronic records 
management system implemented by the President is able to capture, 
manage, and preserve electronic messages that are readily accessible 
for retrieval through electronic searches.202   
                                                          
 194. JASON R. BARON, E-MAIL METADATA IN A POST-ARMSTRONG WORLD 5 (1999), 
available at http://www.archives.gov/era/pdf/baron-email-metadata.pdf. 
 195. See supra notes 89–93 (discussing risks of failing to keep users accountable).  
 196. See supra notes 89–93  (noting the risks of a failure to track users’ activity).  
 197. See McCartney, supra note 76 (noting that many of the lost e-mails are 
believed to coincide with the outset of the Iraq war). 
 198. See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 443 U.S. 425, 448–49 (1977) (noting that 
the President’s ability to give an assurance of confidentiality is a prime rationale for 
the theory of executive privilege). 
 199. There is no reason to believe that the White House’s archiving problems 
were unavoidable.  See McCartney, supra note 76 (quoting Bill Tolson, director of 
legal and regulatory solutions marketing at Mimosa Systems, who observed that 
“[t]here never has been a technical reason [for the White House] not to have this 
capability in place.  Perhaps it was a matter of budgetary constraints or political foot 
dragging, but technology is not an obstacle.”). 
 200. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (noting that the President sets the 
actual electronic records management policies).  
 201. 44 U.S.C. § 2103(a) (2000).  
 202. Electronic Message Preservation Act of 2008, H.R. 5811, 110th Cong.  
§ 3(a)–(b) (2008).  
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NARA officials have discussed record-keeping policies with White 
House officials in the past,203 indicating that it is entirely possible to 
discuss and certify record-keeping systems without discovering, or 
divulging, records themselves.204  For example, NARA collaborated 
with the Office of Administration Counsel, the White House Office of 
Records Management, and the White House Counsel in an effort to 
implement the ECRMS, starting in 2002.205  However, these meetings 
were not routine,206 and the Archivist had no authority under the PRA 
to report to Congress unless the President actually communicated a 
desire to dispose of certain records, which did not occur.207   
Thus, under the EMPA, it is unlikely that the Archivist would have 
encountered actual presidential records. Moreover, Congress would 
have learned about the White House’s record-keeping system from 
the Archivist on a consistent basis, but there is reason to believe that 
confidential communications would not have been disclosed.208   
This certification requirement would not have impermissibly 
burdened the ability of the President to communicate frankly with his 
advisors, but would only have alerted Congress to unsatisfactory 
record-keeping practices that have gone unnoticed in the past.209   
                                                          
 203. See supra notes 101–103 and accompanying text (explaining NARA’s initial 
ties with the Executive Branch and its collaboration with Executive Branch offices on 
the ECRMS plan).  
 204. The Supreme Court in Nixon II reasoned that the President and his advisors 
could reasonably assume a level of confidentiality because archivists had amassed an 
unblemished record handling presidential materials.  Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 
433 U.S. 425, 452 (1977). 
 205. See McCartney, supra note 76 (remarking that the initial draft of the Concept 
of Operations for the ECRMS project was reviewed by various White House offices 
and NARA).  
 206. See National Security Archive, supra note 93 (showing that although ECRMS 
was proposed in late 2001 to early 2002, the initial draft plan was not reviewed by the 
numerous offices until the end of 2002 through the first half of 2003 and the final 
draft plan was not reviewed until mid-2004). 
 207. See 44 U.S.C. § 2203(c)–(e) (mandating that the President must obtain the 
Archivist’s approval before disposing of records and that the Archivist must consult 
Congress before responding to the President’s record disposal request); see also  
44 U.S.C. § 2106 (1985) (directing the Archivist to “submit to the Congress, in 
January of each year and at such other times as the Archivist finds appropriate, a 
report concerning the administration of functions of the Archivist, the 
Administration, the National Historical Publications and Records Commission, and 
the National Archives Trust Fund,” but not mentioning any authority to comment on 
the President’s electronic record-keeping practices absent a disposal request). 
 208. See supra notes 129–132 and accompanying text (explaining that the EMPA’s 
proposed amendments to the PRA would require the Archivist to report to Congress 
regarding White House electronic record-keeping systems on an annual basis; 
however, these amendments would not take effect until one year after the EMPA’s 
enactment).   
 209. See supra Part II.B (describing the White House’s past inadequate archiving 
that led to the controversies surrounding “Scooter” Libby and the termination of 
eight U.S. Attorneys). 
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C. Regardless of Whether Passage of the EMPA Would Have Disrupted the 
Executive Branch in the Performance of Its Constitutional Duties, the Impact 
Would Have Been Justified by an Overriding Need to Promote Objectives that 
Fall Within Congress’s Authority 
Laws are not presumptively unconstitutional merely because they 
may impose limited intrusions on executive confidentiality.  In Nixon 
II, the Supreme Court held that the PRMPA could be upheld, 
regardless of any potential intrusions, if the “impact is justified by an 
overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional 
authority of Congress.”210  Thus, the Court delineated two 
requirements which, if satisfied, justify the intrusion:  first, the 
legislation’s objective must be within the constitutional authority of 
Congress and, second, an overriding need to promote the objective 
of the legislation must exist.211  
Regarding the first requirement, the Nixon II Court declared that 
“[t]here is abundant statutory precedent for the regulation and 
mandatory disclosure of documents in the possession of the 
Executive Branch.”212  Moreover, since the decision, Congress has 
declared that presidential records are the property of the United 
States.213  This legislative declaration bolsters the Court’s prior 
determination in Nixon II that regulation of executive branch 
documents is well within the constitutional authority of Congress.214 
The second requirement for such a law to be upheld is that an 
overriding need to promote the objective of the legislation must 
exist.215  On this count, the Court in Nixon II presented the argument 
that unlimited deference to Presidential privilege would harmfully 
impinge upon the decision-making of future Presidents.216  
Furthermore, the Court did not only waive President Nixon’s claim of 
executive privilege in order to enable effective future presidential 
decision-making; it also noted that the American people have an 
                                                          
 210. 433 U.S. 425, 426 (1977). 
 211. Id.  
 212. See id. at 445 (pointing to the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act, 
the Government in the Sunshine Act, and the Federal Records Act). 
 213. 44 U.S.C. § 2202 (2000).  
 214. The Nixon II Court, however, did not wish to “engage in the debate” 
regarding who held legal title to President Nixon’s materials.  433 U.S. at 446 n.8.  
This was later definitively established by the Presidential Records Act.  See H.R. REP. 
NO. 95–1487, at 2 (1978) (stating explicitly that despite contentious debates about 
records management procedures before and after the President’s term of office, the 
idea of public ownership of presidential records was not controversial).   
 215. Nixon II, 433 U.S. at 426. 
 216. Id. at 452 (“An incumbent President should not be dependent on 
happenstance or the whim of a prior President when he seeks access to records of 
past decisions that define or channel current governmental obligations.”).  
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interest in the ability to understand the reasoning behind the 
decisions of their elected leaders, and that this interest may not be 
“truncated by an analysis of Presidential privilege that focuses only on 
the needs of the present.”217 
1. Congress has the authority to issue legislation that, like the EMPA, 
concerns the regulation of executive branch documents 
The Supreme Court has confirmed that Congress has the authority 
to issue legislation, such as the EMPA, that concerns the regulation of 
executive branch documents.218  Additionally, the EMPA, with its 
provisions that would have enabled the Archivist to issue non-binding 
electronic record-keeping standards and to make subsequent 
certifications of presidential compliance to Congress,219 falls under 
the investigative power with which Congress is endowed.220  Indeed, a 
legitimate legislative purpose will be presumed when the general 
subject of investigation is one in which Congress can legislate and 
when the information sought might aid congressional 
consideration.221  It follows, then, that the creation of legislation that 
aims to investigate executive branch activities that emanate from 
appropriations expenditures, such as electronic archiving of White 
House records,222 is a permissible use of Congressional power.223  
                                                          
 217. Id. at 453.  
 218. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (listing examples of legislation 
which have regulated the executive branch’s handling of documents).   
 219. See H.R. REP. NO. 110–709, at 6 (2008) (explaining that the Archivist’s duty to 
annually certify would enable Congress to learn whether the management controls 
put in place by the President meet the existing requirements of the Presidential 
Records Act as well as the standards developed by the Archivist).  
 220. See, e.g., McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927) (“A legislative body 
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the 
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the 
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information—which not 
infrequently is true—recourse must be had to others who do possess it.”). 
 221. See, e.g., United States v. Cross, 170 F. Supp. 303, 306 (D.D.C. 1959) (utilizing 
the legislative purpose rule when considering the question of whether, when the 
defendant Cross was recalled before the Select Committee and gave allegedly false 
testimony upon which the indictment was based, the Committee propounded the 
questions to the defendant Cross for the purpose of eliciting from him facts which 
might aid in legislation). 
 222. For example, as part of the proposed budget for the fiscal year of 2009, the 
White House requested $11,923,000 for continued modernization of the information 
technology infrastructure within the Executive Office of the President.  OFFICE OF 
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT:  APPENDIX, FISCAL YEAR 2009 1055 (2008), available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/USbudget/fy09/pdf/appendix/eop.pdf.  Also, the White 
House requested $8,000,000 for the costs of processing records of the departing 
President and Vice President under the Presidential Records Act, transferring 
records to the NARA, and paying for other transition-related administrative 
expenses.  Id. at 1063.   
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Historically, legitimate congressional investigations have focused on 
the types of executive branch activities that can be traced to 
constitutional clauses giving the executive exclusive authority to act, 
such as military action and bureaucratic administration.224   
The EMPA’s certification requirement, which would have tasked 
the head of an administrative body with issuing electronic record-
keeping standards and then reporting back to Congress regarding 
the White House’s progress towards those goals, are well within 
Congress’s investigative power and did not constitute an improper 
delegation to the Archivist.225  Congress has the authority to secure 
needed information relative to legislation through tools such as 
registration, answers to questionnaires, congressional committees, or 
through administrative bodies that exist in a manner prescribed by 
Congress.226  This certification requirement would have enabled 
Congress to gain vital information about White House compliance 
with the letter and spirit of the PRA.227  Importantly, this information 
would have been received by Congress on a consistent basis,228 rather 
than in a piecemeal and fortuitous fashion.229  The information 
provided by the Archivist would help the legislative branch determine 
                                                          
 223. Cf. William P. Marshall, The Limits of Congress’s Authority to Investigate the 
President, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 781, 800–01 (2004) (describing the federal legislative 
power as very broad and noting that “[e]verything the Executive does, by definition, 
fits within the scope of federal authority and most can be tied to appropriations 
expenditures”).  It is far more difficult to obtain the authorization of both chambers 
of Congress to institute an investigation—as the EMPA requires both House and 
Senate approval—than it is to utilize the powers of one chamber or committee to 
begin an investigation.  See generally id. at 803–06 (considering the limited inherent 
process constraints on the use of the congressional investigatory power).   
This difficulty is evidenced by the fact that the EMPA was never voted on by the 
Senate.   
 224. Id. at 802 nn.127 & 129 (explaining that Congress investigated the 1792 
failed military expedition of General St. Clair as well as purported bureaucratic 
mismanagement in the Department of the Interior and the Department of Forestry 
in the 1920s). 
 225. See supra Part II.C (describing the enactment and substance of EMPA). 
 226. See United States v. Rappeport, 36 F. Supp. 915, 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (citing 
cases that support the multiple tools Congress can use in effectuating its investigatory 
powers); see also Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 205 (1957) (“It is, of course, 
not the function of this Court to prescribe rigid rules for the Congress to follow in 
drafting resolutions establishing investigating committees.  That is a matter 
peculiarly within the realm of the legislature, and its decisions will be accepted by the 
courts up to the point where their own duty to enforce the constitutionally protected 
rights of individuals is affected.”). 
 227. See supra notes 39–43 (explaining that, while the PRA requires the President 
to keep records, the Archivist and the courts cannot review the President’s record-
keeping standards). 
 228. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (detailing how the EMPA requires 
the Archivist to report annually to Congress on the White House’s electronic record-
keeping systems). 
 229. See supra Part II.B (noting how the inadequacies of the White House’s record-
keeping arose while Congress was investigating an unrelated matter). 
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whether further changes to the PRA or to White House information 
technology appropriation levels are necessary. 
A 2002 U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia decision, 
Walker v. Cheney,230 does not indicate that the Archivist lacks the 
authority to certify the adequacy of the White House’s electronic 
record-keeping practices to Congress.  In that case, the court held 
that the Comptroller General of the United States could not compel 
Vice President Cheney to disclose certain documents.231  However, 
Walker was dismissed due to a lack of standing232 and the Court did 
not decide the separation of legislative and executive powers issues 
raised by the controversy.233  Regardless, further factual distinctions 
exist to disassociate Walker from consideration of the EMPA.   
First, the Comptroller was seeking a right of action to obtain a 
judicial order compelling the release of documents,234 while the 
EMPA would have only allowed the Archivist to report to Congress on 
the state of presidential electronic record-keeping practices.235   
The EMPA would have granted neither a right of action to the 
Archivist nor the authority to examine actual records.236  Second, the 
EMPA would have granted the authority to certify compliance with 
standards to the Archivist—the leader of an executive branch 
agency237—and not an agent of Congress, such as the Comptroller 
                                                          
 230. 230 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 231. See id. at 53 (dismissing plaintiff’s action and noting that no court has ever 
granted an order directing the President or the Vice President to produce 
information to Congress). 
 232. See id. at 67 (holding that the Comptroller General, as an agent for Congress, 
had suffered neither the level of personal injury nor institutional injury that would 
confer standing, and that even the injury to the principal, Congress, was “too vague 
and amorphous to confer standing”). 
 233. See id. at 52–53 (explaining that while the case “engender[ed] a struggle 
between the political branches,” the outcome of the case was ultimately ordained by 
“equally fundamental separation of powers concerns relating to the restricted role of 
the Article III courts in our constitutional system of government”). 
 234. Id. at 58 (“The Comptroller General filed this action seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief . . . . Specifically, relying upon his authority to investigate and 
evaluate under 31 U.S.C. §§ 712 and 717, and his right to obtain access to documents 
under § 716, the Comptroller General requests that the Court order the  
Vice President to produce documents . . . .”). 
 235. See supra Part II.C (outlining the limits of the Archivist’s powers under the 
EMPA). 
 236. See supra Part II.C (explaining the distinction between the Archivist’s duty to 
promulgate record-keeping standards and the President’s responsibility to 
implement policies to meet those standards).  
 237. Regardless of whether NARA is considered to be a truly independent agency 
or not, there is a great deal that distinguishes NARA from the General Accounting 
Office.  The General Accounting Office is an instrumentality of the United States 
Government, independent of the executive departments.  It was created by Congress 
to be an officer that checked upon the application of funds in accordance with 
appropriations and is subservient to Congress.  See, e.g., Walker, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 53. 
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General.238  For these reasons, Walker is irrelevant to the argument 
presented herein. 
Thus, Congress has authority to issue legislation regulating 
executive branch documents.  This role gains importance when 
considering that the PRA and subsequent court decisions have made 
it difficult for private litigants to challenge presidential record-
keeping practices.239  Therefore, the current statutory framework 
endows Congress with the sole responsibility to see that the White 
House is preserving records for eventual use by other Administrations 
and the citizens of the United States.240  The EMPA’s certification 
requirement would have allowed Congress to exercise this 
responsibility by utilizing its investigative powers to apply political 
checks on the White House by publicizing any lack of compliance 
with the Archivist’s standards.241  This type of law would enable the 
early detection, or even the preemption, of electronic record-keeping 
                                                          
 238. While the Archivist may be removed by the President without cause, the 
Comptroller General is removable only by Congress.  See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 
714, 714–15 (1986) (holding that the Comptroller General’s role in exercising 
executive functions “violated the constitutionally imposed doctrine of separation of 
powers because the Comptroller General is removable only by a congressional joint 
resolution or by impeachment, and Congress may not retain the power of removal 
over an officer performing executive powers”). 
 239. See Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Allowing judicial 
review of the President’s general compliance with the Act at the behest of private 
litigants would substantially upset Congress’s carefully crafted balance of presidential 
control of records creation, management, and disposal during the President’s term 
of office and public ownership and access to records after expiration of the 
President’s term.”).  But see Am. Historical Ass’n v. Peterson, 876 F. Supp. 1300, 1313 
(D.D.C. 1995) (interpreting that precedent limits judicial review of Presidential 
record-keeping decisions to “guidelines outlining what is and what is not a 
‘Presidential record’”).  
 240. See Carl Bretscher, Presidential Records Act:  The President and Judicial Review 
Under the Records Acts, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1477, 1480 (1992) (noting that the 
Armstrong court decided that Congress was willing to rely on administrative 
enforcement and political checks, rather than judicial review, to ensure that the 
Office of the President complied with statutory record-keeping obligations applicable 
to other parts of the executive branch).   
 241. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the value of public knowledge as a 
check that both verifies and encourages good government.  Cf. Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 595 (1980) (arguing that trials should be 
open because they “assure the public that procedural rights are respected, and that 
justice is afforded equally.  Closed trials breed suspicion of prejudice and 
arbitrariness, which in turn spawns disrespect for law.  Public access is essential, 
therefore, if trial adjudication is to achieve the objective of maintaining public 
confidence in the administration of justice.”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976) 
(noting that campaign finance disclosure requirements may serve to deter public 
officials from using campaign contributions either improperly both before and after 
an election). 
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problems, whereas retention problems in the past have been revealed 
only through unrelated investigations.242   
2. The EMPA would have addressed the overriding need to ensure the 
existence of presidential records for future Administrations and for United 
States citizens 
The overriding need that justifies legislation like the EMPA is that 
it helps to ensure that America’s future Presidents will be able to take 
note of the factors and complexities that have gone into previous 
decisions—an objective that the Nixon II Court explicitly approved.243  
However, without the guidance and certification of the Archivist, 
various Administrations have not implemented satisfactory electronic 
record-keeping systems that are able to consistently preserve and 
segregate White House records.244   
Enabling the Archivist to issue standards and then certify 
compliance will likely decrease the probability of subpar record-
keeping policymaking that seems to have afflicted White House 
administrations in the digital age.  This conclusion stems from the 
knowledge that a systematic lack of collegial consultation between 
information technology professionals, legal professionals, and 
functional departments within an organization often results in 
record-keeping systems that lack the features that enable compliance 
with legal standards.245  In the case of the White House, these failures 
resulted in systems that are not able to comply with statutes, such as 
                                                          
 242. See supra Part II.B (referring to how the public became aware of the White 
House’s inadequate record-keeping during an unrelated Congressional investigation 
of “Scooter” Libby and the termination of eight U.S. Attorneys). 
 243. See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 452–53 & 452 n.14 (1977) 
(approving the Congressional attempt to improve the “hit-or-miss” approach that 
had characterized previous efforts to preserve historically important materials, and 
noting the public interests served by the “rubric of preservation of an accurate and 
complete historical record” (quoting United States v. Nixon, 408 F. Supp. 321,  
348–49 (D.D.C. 1976))). 
 244. See supra Part II.A (giving a timeline of the White House’s use of problematic 
document archiving systems, starting with ARMS in conjunction with the Lotus Notes 
e-mail system and then the resort to manual archiving with the subsequent migration 
to Microsoft Exchange). 
 245. This lack of collaboration has been termed “silo behavior.”  See Jean-Luc 
Chatelain & Daniel B. Garrie, The Good, The Bad and The Ugly of Electronic Archiving:  
An Essay on the State of Enterprise Information Management, 2 J. LEGAL TECH. RISK MGMT. 
90, 93 (2007) (noting that silo behavior consists of two subparts:  “[t]he first, silo 
thinking, results in archiving projects that lack necessary business and legal features 
and functionalities because their design and implementation is largely driven by the 
information technology department without sufficient collegial consultation with 
functional and legal departments.  The second silo implementation, results in 
multiple electronic archiving implementation silos within a given corporation with 
no overall enterprise-wide thinking, which multiplies asset and management costs 
and increases the complexity of handling information search and retrieval”). 
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the PRA and the Federal Records Act, which aim to preserve 
important records.246   
The lack of meaningful collaboration regarding record-keeping 
within the Bush Administration is plainly apparent when considering 
the process by which the Bush White House implemented Microsoft 
Exchange without an adequate archiving system in 2002.247   
While White House information technology professionals were 
concerned by the rash transition from Lotus Notes to Microsoft 
Exchange, it does not appear that their views were adequately 
considered.248  Moreover, NARA officials only were informed about 
this deficiency in January of 2004.249  NARA officials then warned the 
Executive Office of the President that it “was operating at risk by not 
capturing and storing messages outside the email system,”250 but 
NARA did not have express statutory authority to bring Congressional 
attention to the issue.251  Meanwhile, White House information 
technology professionals in the White House were warned not to 
speak candidly with professionals from NARA.252  Finally, the 
promising ECRMS system that had been under development for 
almost five years was nixed at the final possible moment by the Chief 
Information Officer for reasons that are still unclear.253   
A lack of meaningful collaboration during the development of 
electronic record-keeping systems can lead to increased costs.  If and 
when record-keeping problems finally gain attention, the subsequent 
record retrieval process from back-up systems is often complex and 
                                                          
 246. Under the PRA, the President is statutorily required to retain records which 
relate to or have an effect upon the carrying out of the constitutional, statutory, or 
other official or ceremonial duties.  See supra Part II.A. 
 247. See Letter, supra note 75, at 5–7 (noting that the migration from Lotus Notes 
to Microsoft Exchange had started by September 2002, while planning for the 
migration had begun prior to 2002).  
 248. See id. at 7–8 (relating that while there were meetings to discuss staff concerns 
with the transition, the transition continued regardless). 
 249. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (emphasizing how NARA could 
only recommend to the Executive Office of the President that the White House 
needed to improve their record-keeping practices, but could not effectuate any 
plans). 
 250. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.  
 251. The record-keeping statutes indicate that the Archivist is directed to report to 
Congress regarding Presidential record-keeping management decisions only when 
the President has made a decision to dispose of records.  See supra Part I.A. 
 252. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (pointing out how during the 
summer of 2006, the Chief Information Officer directed an Information Specialist to 
not discuss potential e-mail retention problems with NARA). 
 253. See supra notes 95–100 and accompanying text (highlighting CIO Payton’s 
obscure reasons, including the time commitment required to implement the ECRMS 
system to the backlog of e-mails and the system’s inability to distinguish between 
federal records and presidential records). 
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costly.254  In the case of the Bush White House, for example, the 
Administration asserted that complying with a court order to preserve 
certain e-mails by searching individual workstations would entail 
“significant” cost and would be “extensive and time consuming.”255   
More important than mere costs and burdens, a lack of 
collaboration can be expected to raise the probability that future 
Presidents will be prevented from accessing the desired records of 
past Administrations.256  The complete loss of historically invaluable 
records is possible because back-up systems are not always reliable.257  
It is certainly reasonable to assert that future Presidents would be 
hampered by the possible absence of White House e-mail records for 
the period between March 1, 2003 and May 22, 2003258—a span of 
weeks that includes the invasion of Iraq, one of the most contested 
decisions the Bush Administration has made.  The EMPA attempted 
to preempt such losses by empowering an executive branch official to 
issue standards that take into account the requirements of modern, 
capable electronic record-keeping systems.259 
The American public also has an interest in the existence of 
presidential records.260  The public’s ability to understand the 
                                                          
 254. See Chatelain & Garrie, supra note 245, at 93–94 (arguing that many decisions 
in choosing between differing technologies in the archiving field focus on the 
acquisition cost of the hardware, while ignoring the potentially high costs of retrieval 
in the event of litigation or regulatory compliance requests). 
 255. See Defendants’ Responses to and Requests for Reconsideration of the First 
Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff NSA’s Motion to Extend 
TRO/Preservation Order at 14–15, Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in 
Washington v. Executive Office of the President, No. 07-1577, 2008 WL 2932173 
(D.D.C July 29, 2008) (arguing that there is no indication that irreparable harm will 
result from a decision not to conduct burdensome inspection of individual 
workstations in the White House because “disaster recovery back-up tapes should 
contain substantially all relevant emails” between 2003 and 2005 (emphasis added)). 
 256. The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that future Presidents have an 
interest in the existence of the records of their predecessors.  See supra note 216 and 
accompanying text (expressing the view that future Presidents should be guaranteed 
access to all previous presidential records, instead of relying on the discretion of 
their predecessors). 
 257. See Chatelain & Garrie, supra note 245, at 91 (noting that enterprises that 
operate without implementing archiving systems often are forced to rely on media as 
unsecured and unregimented as CDs or DVDs “in some employees’ desk drawers”). 
 258. See supra Part II.A (explaining the past and continuing inadequacies of White 
House record-keeping systems). 
 259. See supra Part II.C (summarizing the EMPA’s expansion of the Archivist’s role 
in the White House’s record-keeping practices). 
 260. The Presidential Records Act defined presidential records as publicly owned.  
See supra Part I.A.  Prior to that legislative enactment, the Supreme Court in Nixon II 
had also acknowledged the public’s interest in the historical record.  See Nixon v. 
Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 452 (1977) (noting that the American people’s 
ability to reconstruct their history should not be limited by an overly broad principle 
of executive privilege). 
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workings of the elected government is an interest that the Founders261 
and the Supreme Court262 have confirmed as legitimate and 
important to a functioning democracy.263  Once again, however, it is 
important to note the distinction between the existence and disclosure 
of records.  Private citizens may not be able to demand disclosure of 
presidential records, as considerations of executive privilege may 
prevent the release of certain records at certain times;264 however, 
since the records belong to the United States, private citizens have an 
interest in the very existence of the records.265  Without key portions 
of this publicly-owned record, the ability to piece together and 
comprehend disparate documents and e-mails will be irreparably 
damaged.266  Just as the EMPA will cater to the overriding need of 
future presidents to access past presidential documents by lessening 
the probability of unsatisfactory White House record-keeping 
practices, it will also address citizens’ interest in the existence of a 
completely documented presidency. 
                                                          
 261. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9  
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON:  COMPRISING HIS PUBLIC PAPERS AND HIS PRIVATE 
CORRESPONDENCE, INCLUDING NUMEROUS LETTERS AND DOCUMENTS NOW FOR THE FIRST 
TIME PRINTED, at 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1910) (“A popular 
Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a 
Prologue to a Farce or Tragedy; or, perhaps both.”); John Adams, A Dissertation on the 
Canon and the Feudal Law, BOSTON GAZETTE, Sept. 30, 1765, available at 
http://www.indiana.edu/~h105swrd/readings/H105-documents-web/week06/ 
Adams1765.html (writing that the people “have a right, an indisputable, unalienable, 
indefeasible divine right to that most dreaded, and envied kind of knowledge,  
I mean of the characters and conduct of their rulers”). 
 262. See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (noting that 
“informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment” 
in the course of holding that a tax abridged the freedom of the press and was, thus, 
unconstitutional). 
 263. See generally Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets:  The Role Courts Should Play in 
Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 140–47 (2006) (connecting the 
importance of the contemporary right of access to government information to the 
guarantees of the First Amendment because those guarantees are “weak rights if 
government officials withhold information necessary to a complete understanding of 
the issue in controversy”). 
 264. See supra notes 35–38 (explaining how the PRA shields presidential records 
from the public for numerous reasons, including if the records relate to national 
security, trade secrets, personal medical files, or requests for advice). 
 265. Cf. Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“We find that the 
statutory language and legislative history of both [the PRA and the FRA] indicate 
that one of the reasons that Congress mandated the creation and preservation of 
federal and presidential records was to ensure that private researchers and historians 
would have access to the documentary history of the federal government.”). 
 266. Cf. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 452–53 (1977) (affirming the 
interest of both future Presidents and the public to understand American history). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The White House’s rationale for threatening to veto the EMPA is 
not aligned with presidential record-keeping jurisprudence.   
The EMPA would not have hampered the President’s ability to 
perform his or her constitutional functions because the bill did not 
transfer record-keeping authority away from the executive branch.  
Moreover, even if the legislation did cause limited intrusions, 
Congress has constitutional authority to promote the important 
objective of preserving presidential records for use by future 
Administrations and the American public.   
It is important to note that even though legislation like the EMPA 
may be facially constitutional, it is not guaranteed to better preserve 
presidential records.  While the NARA’s lack of independence 
enabled the EMPA to pass constitutional muster, it may also have 
limited the true effectiveness of record-keeping standards and 
certification carried out under the EMPA.  Indeed, since the 
President does not need to point to specific reasons in order to 
dismiss the Archivist,267 the Archivist would have possibly been 
hesitant to promulgate tough standards or make harshly critical 
certifications to Congress.   
The Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington 
(“CREW”), for instance, criticized the bill because it contained  
“no effective enforcement mechanisms,” leading the group to believe 
that “a president [could] ignore his record keeping responsibilities 
with impunity.”268  CREW recommended, instead, that the legislation 
incorporate either a private right of action to challenge record-
keeping practices or noncompliance penalties.  However, placing 
further pressure on the President, such as enabling judicial review of 
White House record-keeping by private litigants,269 may implicate the 
very burdens that the EMPA so carefully avoided by keeping record-
keeping policymaking, implementation, and appraisal within the 
                                                          
 267. The President does not have to cite inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance in office as reasons for dismissing the Archivist, as he or she must in 
order to fire leaders of other independent agencies.  See supra Part III.A.2 (arguing 
that NARA resembles a traditional executive branch agency more than an 
independent agency).  In the case of Archivist John Carlin, who served from 1995 to 
2005, the White House did not give any explanation for his ouster.  See also Bruce P. 
Montgomery, Their Records, Our History, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2005, at B04 (asserting 
that “Carlin’s dismissal was just the latest episode in the ongoing politicization of 
NARA”). 
 268. Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, CREW’s Analysis of 
Electronic Communications Preservation Act (2008), http://www.citizensforethics. 
org/files/Leg%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf.  
 269. See supra note 239 (citing the decision in Armstrong, which held that the PRA 
precluded judicial review of the President’s record-keeping policies). 
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executive branch.270  Thus, the House of Representatives crafted a bill 
that would not have upset the balance of powers—but in so doing, 
Congress may have denied it the sufficient muscle to overcome the 
White House tradition of ineffective electronic record-keeping. 
                                                          
 270. See supra Part III.A (arguing that despite the White House’s stance on the 
EMPA, the EMPA places all White House record-keeping power within the executive 
branch). 
